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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Two debates, one about abortion and the other about embryonic 
stem cell research1 and therapeutic cloning,2 are being conflated in 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. (philosophy), Barnard 
College; Ph.D. (anthropology), Princeton; J.D., Yale. I am deeply appreciative to Cindie 
Leigh, Reference Librarian, Hofstra University School of Law, for her bibliographic talents 
which she has shared with generosity. I am also grateful to Roshni Devi Persaud, Hofstra 
University School of Law (class of 2004), and Svetlana Mirkis, Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law (class of 2004), for their assistance with research. Hofstra University School of Law 
provided research support that facilitated preparation of this Article. 
 1. The National Institutes of Health define a stem cell as “a cell from the embryo, fe-
tus, or adult that has, under certain conditions, the ability to reproduce itself for long peri-
ods or, in the case of adult stem cells, throughout the life of the organism.” NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ES-2 (2001). Human stem cells were first isolated in the 
late 1990s. A group of scientists at the University of Wisconsin isolated human embryonic 
stem cells in 1998. James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Hu-
man Blastocysts, 282 SCI. 1145 (1998). In the same year, a group of scientists at Johns 
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social and legal discourse. The two debates resemble each other. 
Within each, society has fashioned a context for discourse that allows 
people to entertain and dispute the scope of personhood and the pa-
rameters of community. Moreover, public disagreement within each 
debate has focused around the meaning of the term embryo.3 
 Those similarities notwithstanding, this Article argues that a 
fundamental discontinuity distinguishes the two debates. The debate 
about abortion, framed in response to the needs and demands of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, concerns the preservation of a 
world view that valued hierarchy, fixed roles, and communal solidar-
                                                                                                                      
Hopkins University isolated human germ cells from fetuses. See Michael J. Shamblott et 
al., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Cultured Human Primordial Germ Cells, 95 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13726 (1998). The promise of stem cell research is enormous; in-
cluding tailor-made replacement tissue for patients with failing organs and for others suf-
fering from a variety of neurological conditions such as Parkinson’s disease. Fred Guterl & 
Karen Lowry Miller, Attack of the Clones, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 2003, at 40. 
 2. The term therapeutic cloning refers to cloning embryos for use in medical research 
and therapy. Synonyms include research cloning, cloning-for-biomedical-research, somatic-
cell nuclear transfer (or transplantation), and simply cloning (though, without further 
clarification, this last term may imply reproductive cloning). Some have rejected the term 
therapeutic cloning, largely for strategic reasons: the journal Nature “wanted to distance 
[human embryonic stem] cells from the term ‘cloning’ to insulate the research from the 
emotional valence of the cloning debate.” Paul Root Wolpe & Glenn McGee, “Expert Bio-
ethics” as Professional Discourse: The Case of Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM 
CELL DEBATE: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 185, 188 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 
2001). This distancing is hard to justify in that human embryonic stem cell research often 
depends on somatic cell nuclear transfer: in effect, on cloning. Id. Moreover, moral ques-
tions about therapeutic cloning are often indistinguishable from questions about embryonic 
stem cell research. Id. In the main, this Article uses the terms research cloning or thera-
peutic cloning to refer to somatic cell nuclear transfer (or transplantation) for the produc-
tion of embryos for use in research. A more accurate term might be simply non-
reproductive cloning. However, the term is not often used in popular or legal literature. In 
order to reflect common usage, this Article generally relies on other, more frequently used, 
terms. Sometimes alternative terms are used. No distinction in meaning is intended unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 3. This Article delineates the ideological implications of arguments about embryonic 
or fetal life for two broad social debates in American society. Thus, in the context of this 
Article, differences between embryos and fetuses are of less importance than they may be 
for scientists, theologians, or pregnant women. 
 For scientists, embryos become fetuses at about eight weeks of gestation. In fact, how-
ever, there is significant confusion even among scientists about the precise meaning of the 
term embryo. Simon B. Auerbach, Comment, Taking Another Look at the Definition of an 
Embryo: President Bush’s Criteria and the Problematic Application of Federal Regulations 
to Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 51 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1567 (2002) (citing Professor Glen 
McGee, Address at Emory University Stem Cell Panel (Oct. 5, 2000)). Auerbach reports 
that one bioethics professor found great disagreement among twenty embryologists when 
he asked them what the term embryo means. Id. at 1568 (citing Glen McGee, Address at 
Emory University Stem Cell Workshop (Feb. 21, 2002)). In particular, Auerbach noted, it is 
not clear whether a five-day old fertilized egg should be categorized as an embryo. Id. at 
1567-68. Only in the last half of the twentieth century did it become comparatively easy to 
obtain early embryos for research. Before the advent of in vitro fertilization, most embryos 
available for scientific research were the products of miscarriages and were thus not living. 
Lynn M. Morgan, Materializing the Fetal Body, in FETAL SUBJECTS, FEMINIST POSITIONS 
43, 50 (Lynn M. Morgan & Meredith W. Michaels eds., 1999). 
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ity more than equality and choice—a world view that had been rele-
gated mostly to the domestic arena by the middle years of the nine-
teenth century.4 The debate about embryonic stem cell research and 
therapeutic cloning raises novel questions about personhood. This 
debate is being framed in response to very different needs and de-
mands than those that defined the central ideological debates of the 
two previous centuries. In part, the needs and demands of the pre-
sent century are being constructed in response to society’s expanding 
capacity to disseminate information and to alter biological structures 
and thus to redefine the essence of being human. In particular, the 
debate about embryonic research (in comparison with that about 
abortion) largely assumes autonomous individuality and then focuses 
on and assesses the nature of the autonomous individual.5  
 In order to disentangle the debate about abortion from that about 
research cloning and embryonic stem cell research, this Article ana-
lyzes the embryo-as-symbol and suggests that the panoply of mean-
ings attributed to embryo serves to elide, or even disguise, the central 
concerns underlying the complicated, often volatile, and generally 
confusing debate about abortion and the emerging debate about em-
bryonic research and cloning for the production of research embryos. 
 Both cloning and embryonic stem cell research have focused pub-
lic attention on the meaning and status of human embryos in con-
texts essentially unrelated to abortion. As a result, society and the 
law have begun to construct new understandings of the term embryo. 
Those understandings merge with and reshape old understandings. 
Thus, the politics of abortion are being transformed as society re-
sponds to developments in molecular biology, especially the advent of 
mammalian cloning in 19976 and the isolation of human embryonic 
stem cells a year later.7  
 Neither discourse about abortion nor discourse about cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research can adequately be interpreted apart 
from an underlying ideological shift in American society that became 
evident in the last decades of the twentieth century.8 That broader 
underlying shift implicates the contours of personhood, family life, 
and community. And in consequence, both debates (largely through 
interpretations of their shared central symbol, the embryo) serve as a 
pretext for entertaining broader disputes about underlying social 
goals and values. 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
 5. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
 6. I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 
385 NATURE 810 (1997). 
 7. See Thomson et al., supra note 1.  
 8. See infra Parts III - IV. 
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 The politics of abortion have reflected disagreements about the 
status of fetuses and embryos, and even more fundamentally, dis-
agreements about a set of underlying issues that include the legiti-
macy of feminism, the importance of gender in understandings of 
personhood, the value of so-called traditional forms of relationship 
within the domestic sphere, and the implications of displacing those 
forms of relationship with others that assume autonomous individu-
ality in place of communal solidarity. For pro-life adherents in par-
ticular, the politics of abortion further (and sometimes mask) a broad 
agenda concerned with preserving a model of family life and under-
standings of personhood that developed in the early years of the In-
dustrial Revolution. Similarly, the much more recent debate about 
embryonic stem cells and therapeutic cloning implicates understand-
ings of personal identity and social relationships. It represents the 
swan song of an understanding of personhood that reflects the values 
of the Enlightenment and that has served the needs of the Industrial 
Revolution. And it represents, as well, a new debate about person-
hood that assumes autonomous individuality even in familial set-
tings. 
 This Article interprets the debate about abortion and the debate 
about embryonic research and therapeutic cloning as aspects of a 
larger history of ideas. The Article suggests that embryos increas-
ingly stand for different truths in discourse about abortion on the 
one-hand and about embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic 
cloning on the other. More specifically, the Article suggests that the 
contemporary debate about the meaning of the embryo in the context 
both of abortion and of embryonic research bespeaks a widespread 
transformation in Western, and especially American, society during 
the last three or four decades. At base, that transformation involves 
displacement of an understanding of personhood, particularly in do-
mestic settings that depended on the submersion of individualism 
with an understanding of personhood that values autonomous indi-
viduality and that envisions community as the consequence of indi-
viduals’ distinct choices rather than as a pre-existing, hierarchically 
structured whole.9 
 Part II of this Article briefly presents the scope of the contempo-
rary social and legal debate about embryonic research, including es-
pecially embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic cloning. Part 
III outlines the ideological history of the debate about abortion and 
then describes the socio-cultural and legal frameworks within which 
understandings of the term embryo have developed. It explores the 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See LOUIS DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 1-20 (Mark Sainsbury et al. trans., 1980) (1911) (considering cultural impli-
cations of Western individualism as compared with traditional Indian caste system). 
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central contentions that have defined the debate about abortion since 
the second half of the twentieth century. This Part also suggests that 
pro-life groups may sometimes elide their own essential ideological 
interests in the effort to forge political and legal strategies for oppos-
ing abortion. Part IV returns to the issues raised by research cloning 
and embryonic stem cell research. This Part summarizes responses 
of lawmakers to embryonic research. Part V analyzes the parameters 
of the ideological divide that separates the twentieth century debate 
about embryos in the context of abortion from that now unfolding in 
the context of therapeutic cloning and stem cell research. This Part 
suggests that shifting understandings of embryo symbolize broad 
changes in social understandings of personhood. 
II.   THE EMBRYO IN SCIENCE: RESEARCH CLONING AND EMBRYONIC 
STEM CELL RESEARCH 
 Developments in science and technology beginning in the last 
years of the twentieth century have generated a new notion of em-
bryo that has, in turn, facilitated novel conceptions of reproduction, 
sexuality, health, and relationship.10 This new embryo, unlike the 
embryo of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is formed outside 
the human body; it can be created either through joining sperm and 
egg in vitro11 or through the transfer of somatic cells into denucleated 
ova;12 it provides for reproduction apart from sexuality;13 it promises 
salvation for people now suffering or likely to suffer from serious ill-
ness or disability;14 and it is a source of potential wealth for the fledg-
ling biotechnology industry and the related, though more estab-
lished, pharmaceutical industry.15 This new embryo represents un-
precedented forms of human reproduction and relationship and sug-
                                                                                                                      
 10. See Auerbach, supra note 3, at 1559-60, 1567-68. 
 11. N.Y.S. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY 51-59 (1998) [hereinafter N.Y.S. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW]. 
 12. Wilmut et al., supra note 6. 
 13. See N.Y.S. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 11, at 51-59. 
 14. See Robert A. Weinberg, Of Clones and Clowns, 289 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 52, 57 
(2002) (noting “potential” of therapeutic cloning “to revolutionize the treatment of a num-
ber of currently untreatable degenerative diseases”). 
 15. See David Firn & Victoria Griffith, Stem Cell Science on a Shoestring: Biotechnol-
ogy: Moral Objections Have Hampered Cloning Research. But Lack of Funds may Kill it 
Off, Michael West Tells Victoria, FIN. TIMES (London), July 18, 2002, at 11 (reporting deci-
sion of publicly traded biotechnology company, Geron, in California, to shift work with em-
bryonic cells for transplantation to “become a traditional pharmaceuticals company”); 
Weinberg, supra note 14, at 57 (noting the speed with which biotechnology industry is 
moving ahead to develop uses of therapeutic cloning for potential treatment of disease).  
106  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:101 
 
gests novel approaches to health care that stimulate dreams of 
greatly expanded lifespans and even of immortality.16 
 This Part describes the events that brought this new embryo into 
public consciousness. That happened dramatically in 1978 with the 
first successful use of in vitro fertilization to create a human baby.17 
This Part outlines relevant aspects of the development of reproduc-
tive technology after that time, the advent of somatic cell nuclear 
transfer in mammals in 1997, and the isolation of embryonic stem 
cells in 1998.18 These developments have engendered the social con-
struction of the new embryo. This notion of the embryo, in turn, has 
raised a host of moral conundrums and has spawned a widespread 
social and legal debate about the ontological status of embryonic life 
that reflects aspects of the preexisting debate about abortion.19  
 That preexisting debate depended centrally on assertions about 
the status of the embryo and fetus. Many of those assertions, espe-
cially from pro-life adherents, are being sorely challenged by society’s 
increasing readiness to support and use contemporary developments 
in molecular biology and medicine.20  
A.   Reproductive Technology and In Vitro Fertilization 
 In 1978, Louise Brown, the first baby conceived outside a woman’s 
body,21 was born in Oldham, England.22 Since that time, reproductive 
technology has provided, among other things, for cryopreserving 
gametes and embryos for years, possibly even for decades;23 testing 
embryos for genetic flaws prior to implantation;24 and transferring 
ova, produced in the body of one women and fertilized in vitro, to the 
body of a second woman for gestation and birth.25 Moreover, treat-
                                                                                                                      
 16. See, e.g., BEN BOVA, IMMORTALITY 3 (1998) (asserting that “[t]here are men and 
women alive today who may well be able to live for centuries, perhaps even extending their 
life spans indefinitely”). 
 17. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 305-06 (1998). 
 18. Part III, infra, considers more fully the socio-political responses to the develop-
ments delineated in this Part. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See Weinberg, supra note 14, at 57 (noting potential of therapeutic cloning to revo-
lutionize the treatment of a number of currently not treatable degenerative diseases). 
 21. See Howard W. Jones, Jr. & James P. Toner, Current Concepts: The Infertile Cou-
ple, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1712 (1993) (describing in vitro fertilization). 
 22. See, e.g., Sandra Redcliff, Louise Brown Talks About Life Under the Microscope 
From Day 1, SCOTTISH DAILY REC., Jan. 17, 1994, at 2/21; Paul Wells, World’s First Test-
Tube Baby, Teenager Visits In-Vitro Clinic, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Oct. 10, 1993, at A3. 
 23. See Owen K. Davis & Zev Rosenwaks, Assisted Reproductive Technology, in TEXT-
BOOK OF REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 571, 583 (Bruce R. Carr & Richard E. Blackwell eds., 
1993). 
 24. See Peter Gorner, Pre-Conception Test for Down’s Syndrome, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 
1995, at A4.  
 25. See John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Em-
bryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 991 (2001). 
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ment for infertility has produced so-called spare embryos: that is,  
embryos produced in vitro and cryopreserved for future reproductive 
use but not in fact needed for that purpose.26  
 As a result of such developments, biological maternity has been 
separated into two different aspects (gestational and genetic), repro-
duction has been divorced from sexuality, and the presumed biologi-
cal anchors through which families were once understood are being 
replaced with a variety of alternative truths about human reproduc-
tion. Each of these developments raises questions about the scope of 
family and the essence of personhood. And each raises new questions 
or re-frames old questions about the status of embryos. The phe-
nomenon of spare embryos, in particular, suggests a new vision of the 
embryo and engenders a new debate about the use and status of em-
bryonic matter.  
 Disputes occasioned by embryo cryopreservation have forced 
courts to delineate the appropriate disposition and to discuss the on-
tological status of four to eight cell frozen embryos.27 Several legal 
cases have involved disputes between divorcing couples about the 
disposition of embryos frozen during treatment for infertility.28 One 
case, Davis v. Davis,29 decided in Tennessee in 1992, starkly suggests 
the law’s confusion about embryos. The case developed out of a dis-
pute between a divorcing couple about the disposition of seven frozen 
embryos produced from the husband’s sperm and the wife’s ova. Each 
of the three state courts that rendered decisions in the case charac-
terized the ontological status of the disputed embryos differently 
from the other two. The trial court portrayed the embryos as children 
and vested temporary custody of the frozen embryos with the divorc-
ing wife.30 The intermediate appellate court understood the status of 
the embryos as resting somewhere between property and body or-
                                                                                                                      
 26. Barbara Gregoratos, Note, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare 
Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 977 (1986). 
 27. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (in absence of contract, 
court relied on balancing of interests of divorcing spouses to determine appropriate disposi-
tion of frozen embryos produced from husband’s sperm and wife’s ova); Kass v. Kass, No. 
19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (unpublished decision), rev’d, 663 
N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (relying on contracts 
to resolve dispute between divorcing spouses about disposition of frozen embryos produced 
from husband’s sperm and wife’s ova); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 270-71 (Wash. 
2002), amended by sub nom. In re Marriage of Litowitz, 53 P.3d 516 (Wash. 2002), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 123 S. Ct. 1271 (2003) (mem.) (In a dispute between di-
vorcing husband progenitor and non-progenitor wife about frozen embryos, the court relied 
on contract entered into between fertility center and divorcing husband and wife.). 
 28. See cases cited supra note 27. 
 29. No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev’d, No. 180, 1990 
WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff’d, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), reh’g in 
part No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992) (mem.). 
 30. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *1. 
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gans.31 And the state’s highest court concluded that the embryos, 
while neither persons nor property, enjoyed a special status because 
of their potential for human life.32 
 For the most part, courts, entertaining disputes about frozen em-
bryos, have relied on contractual agreements to resolve such dis-
putes,33 or in the absence of such agreements, on the comparative in-
terests of the parties.34 However, a few state trial courts, including 
the trial court in Davis, have ascribed human status to frozen em-
bryos.35 Stored embryos have presented new questions to a legal sys-
tem that assumed, at least since Roe v. Wade,36 that embryos develop 
inside women’s bodies.37 
 The Catholic Church has consistently opposed the use of repro-
ductive technology on the ground that a child enjoys the right to be 
conceived by a married couple through sexual intercourse.38 Yet, in 
the main, embryos produced in the context of infertility treatment 
have not engendered the sort of intense controversy about the status 
and rights of the embryo that has surrounded discussion of therapeu-
tic cloning and embryonic stem cell research.39 In part, the explana-
tion is simply that ethical discourse surrounding reproductive tech-
nology has focused around a larger set of issues including, for in-
stance, the implications of third-party participation in the reproduc-
tive process,40 the commodification of reproduction,41 the potential for 
                                                                                                                      
 31. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (vesting “joint control” of the embryos in the divorc-
ing husband and wife). 
 32. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-96; see also infra notes 332-38 and accompanying text 
(further considering court’s decision in Davis). 
 33. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-96. 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 604 (noting preference for contractual analysis in resolving dis-
putes about frozen embryos, but relying on balancing interests of parties in absence of such 
an agreement). 
 35. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Davis, 
1989 WL 140495, at *1. See infra notes 332-38 and accompanying text (considering impli-
cations of judicial responses to dispute about embryos in Davis). 
 36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 37. See id. at 152-54 (granting women a limited right to abortion premised on the 
right of a pregnant woman to privacy with regard to her body). 
 38. THE GIFT OF LIFE, (DONUM VITAE): THE PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON THE VATICAN INSTRUCTION ON REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY, 
Opp. at 216 (Marilyn Wallace & Thomas W. Hilgers eds., 1990). 
 39. Steven Kotler, The Final Frontier: Depending on Whom You Ask, Stem-Cell Re-
search Is Either a Medical Godsend or Further Proof That God Is Dead, L.A. WKLY., Jan. 
31, 2003, at 24. 
 40. See, e.g., Kelly Oliver, The Matter of Baby M: Surrogacy and the Courts, in ISSUES 
IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY I: AN ANTHOLOGY 321, 322-27 (Helen Bequaert Holmes 
ed., 1992). 
 41. See, e.g., CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST 
ANALYSIS 199-200 (1987) (referring to the commodification of women, children, and of em-
bryos). 
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racism and classism in the employment of surrogates,42 and the con-
sequences of assisted reproduction for conceptions of the family.43 In 
addition, many who oppose the use of embryos in research are ready 
to ignore the destruction of embryos produced in vitro for reproduc-
tive purposes.44 One commentator suggests that neither the Bush 
administration nor the religious right “wish[es] to confront sterile 
parents or hamper a multimillion-dollar industry.”45 
B.   Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
 About two decades after the birth of the first child conceived in vi-
tro, scientists announced the development of another, significantly 
different method for creating human embryos outside the human 
body: somatic cell nuclear transfer or cloning.46 In 1997, scientists in 
Ireland successfully cloned a lamb, whom they named Dolly.47 The 
technique used to create Dolly, developed by Ian Wilmut at the Ros-
lin Institute in Scotland, involves removing the nucleus from an 
ovum and then merging the denucleated ovum with the nucleus of a 
somatic cell from the animal to be cloned.48 Wilmut’s laboratory used 
an adult sheep’s mammary cell, though in theory any somatic cell 
could have been used49 because each somatic cell contains the full 
complement of the nuclear DNA of the animal.50 After the fertilized 
                                                                                                                      
 42. See Laura M. Purdy, Another Look at Contract, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGY I: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 303, 315-17. 
 43. See CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 21-36 (1989). 
 44. Kotler, supra note 39 (noting that “the [Bush] administration and the religious 
right are opposed to using those ill-fated embryos for stem-cell research, [but] they are 
more than happy to turn a blind eye to their destruction in the name of pregnancy”). 
 45. Id. That the administration and the religious right are reluctant to “confront ster-
ile parents” seems likely. That they are unwilling to “hamper a multimillion-dollar indus-
try” is possible; however, the embryonic stem cell research industry could well grow soon to 
be a multibillion-dollar industry if the law does not prohibit such research. See, e.g., Linda 
B. Blackford, Cloning Bill Would OK Stem Cell Research Two Others Filed Ban All Types, 
Therapeutic or Not, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 2, 2003, at B1 (noting that Lee Todd 
and Jim Ramsey, presidents respectively of the University of Kentucky and the University 
of Louisville, supported a state law that provides for therapeutic cloning and embryonic 
stem cell research in Kentucky; both men recognized stem cell research as important to 
economic development). 
 46. Wilmut et al., supra note 6, at 810.  
 47. Id. In February 2003, the Roslin Institute, where Dolly was cloned, announced the 
sheep’s death; Dolly suffered from progressive lung disease. Jim Gilchrist, A Sheep of 
Faith, THE SCOTSMAN, Feb. 19, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.news.scotsman. 
com/index.cfm?id=208722003 (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). 
 48. Gilchrist, supra note 47. 
 49. Wilmut et al., supra note 6, at 813. 
 50. Human somatic cells normally contain 46 chromosomes: 22 pairs plus an addi-
tional pair composed of two X chromosomes (in the case of a female) or an X chromosome 
and a Y chromosome (in the case of a male). THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, 
HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 35 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/fullreport.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003) 
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY]. Usually, fertilization in humans oc-
curs when the egg cell fuses with a sperm cell, resulting in a zygote containing a nucleus 
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egg cell began to divide51 it was implanted into the uterus of a sheep. 
That sheep gestated and gave birth to the lamb, Dolly.52 Dolly carried 
the DNA of the sheep from which the mammary cell had come, not 
the DNA of the sheep that gestated and gave birth to Dolly.53  
 Responses to cloning were immediate and widespread. Within a 
day of Wilmut’s announcement, President Clinton asked the Na-
tional Bioethics Advisory Commission to study the ethical implica-
tions of cloning and make recommendations for appropriate federal 
responses.54 That group issued a report that recommended congres-
sional action prohibiting somatic cloning of a human for at least 
three to five years.55  
 Congress has not yet passed legislation regulating cloning.56 For 
the most part, however, early responses to the advent of mammalian 
cloning focused on the implications of reproducing humans through 
use of the technique and did not focus on the implications of non-
reproductive cloning for the creation of embryos to be used in re-
search (described popularly as research or therapeutic cloning,57 in 
contrast with reproductive cloning).58 
                                                                                                                      
with 46 chromosomes (half from the female progenitor and half from the male progenitor). 
Id. at 35-36. 
 51. Wilmut facilitated division of the fused cell by activating it with an electric cur-
rent. Other laboratories have effected cell division in the activated egg through the use of 
chemicals. Id. at 36. 
 52. Since the birth of Dolly, researchers elsewhere have successfully cloned a variety 
of other animals including cats, cattle, and mice. Taeyoung Shin et al., A Cat Cloned by 
Nuclear Transplantation, 415 NATURE 859 (2002); Robert P. Lanza et al., Cloned Cattle 
Can be Healthy and Normal, 294 SCI. 1893 (2001); Teruhiko Wakayama et al., Ageing: 
Cloning of Mice to Six Generations, 407 NATURE 318 (2000). 
 53. In addition to the DNA of the somatic cell, the cloned baby also carries mitochon-
drial DNA from the cytoplasm of the egg. Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Con-
stitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 647 (1998). 
Mitochondria are organelles that contain a small amount of DNA; they provide information 
for producing a few mitochondrial proteins. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra 
note 50, at 36. Mitochondria exist in every cell. However, after fertilization mitochondria in 
sperm degrade. This leaves only mitochondria from the egg in the developing zygote. Id. 
Thus, if the egg and the somatic cell come from different females, the resulting baby will 
carry DNA from both of them. Id. 
 54. Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Creating a Clone in Ninety Days: In Search of a Cloning 
Policy, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 24 (1997). 
 55. Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission: Executive Summary, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 3, 6 (1997) [hereinafter 
NBAC 1997].  
 56. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (describing proposed bills about clon-
ing and responses to them). 
 57. See supra note 2. The July 2002 report of the President’s Council on Bioethics 
criticizes use of the term therapeutic cloning on the ground that the only distinction be-
tween research and reproductive cloning “is based entirely on the differing goals of the 
cloners.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50, at 27. The term therapeu-
tic cloning was originally used by advocates of cloning for biomedical research. Id. at 28. 
Some advocates would now prefer to substitute for the term therapeutic cloning, the 
phrase somatic cell nuclear transfer or nuclear transplantation. While acknowledging that 
the suggested change is “not wholly cosmetic and rhetorical,” the President’s Council re-
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 The public began energetically to consider the implications of 
therapeutic cloning in 1998 when two groups of scientists in the 
United States isolated stem cells. One group, at the University of 
Wisconsin, isolated human embryonic stem cells.59 Embryonic stem 
cells are derived from the inner mass of the embryo at the blastocyst 
stage (six to seven days after fertilization).60 Simultaneously, scien-
tists at Johns Hopkins University isolated human fetal germ stem 
cells (taken from fetuses).61 The promise of embryonic stem cells62 de-
pends on their capacity to differentiate into each cell of the body and 
to proliferate indefinitely in vitro.63 Thomas Okarma, President of 
Geron Corporation, described this promise at its grandest: 
The potential for these cells is to allow permanent repair of failing 
organs by injecting healthy functional cells developed from them, 
an approach called regenerative medicine. The significance would 
be to broaden the definition of medical therapy from simply halting 
the progression of acute or chronic disease to include restoration of 
lost organ function. . . . Regenerative medicine would be a totally 
new value paradigm for clinical therapeutics.64 
                                                                                                                      
port opposes the switch because the scientific terminology (somatic cell nuclear transfer or 
nuclear transplantation) “fails to convey the nature of the deed itself, and hides its human 
significance.” Id. at 28. 
 58. In the year or two following announcement of Wilmut’s success in cloning a lamb, 
a significant body of literature about the socio-legal implications of cloning appeared. Few 
of the early responses considered the implications of cloning using human somatic cells to 
create embryos for research rather than for reproduction. See, e.g., Cloning Symposium, 38 
JURIMETRICS J. (1997) (including 12 articles about cloning); Symposium on Human Clon-
ing: Legal, Social, and Moral Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century, 27 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 473 (1999). A Lexis search located fifty-five law review articles containing the words 
therapeutic and cloning in connection with each other. Almost all were published in the 
year 2000 or later. Only four published before 2000 (all published in 1998 or 1999) refer to 
the potential use of cloning as a source of embryonic matter for research. (The search re-
quest to Lexis (Law Review Library, All Review file) was therapeutic w/3 cloning). 
 59. Thomson et al., supra note 1, at 1145. 
 60. See id. Human embryonic stem cells can also be isolated from fetal germinal tis-
sue. Shamblott et at., supra note 1. Multi-potent progenitor cells have been isolated as well 
from adult tissue, including bone marrow. Morayma Reyes et al., Origin of Endothelial 
Progenitors in Human Postnatal Bone Marrow, 109 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 337 (2002). 
 61. Shamblott et al., supra note 1, at 13726. 
 62. Embryonic germ cells, the precursors of sperm and eggs, resemble embryonic stem 
cells in their apparent capacity to differentiate into all cell types. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVI-
SORY COMM’N., ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH: VOLUME I: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 8 (1999), avail-
able at http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/stemcell.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 
2003) [hereinafter NBAC 1999]. Stem cells can additionally be derived from some adult or-
gans, including bone marrow. Id. 
 63. Id. at 9-10. 
 64. Thomas B. Okarma, Human Embryonic Stem Cells: A Primer on the Technology 
and Its Medical Applications, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE: SCIENCE, 
ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 2, at 3, 3. 
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Research on embryonic stem cells depends on the availability of em-
bryos.65 Somatic cell nuclear transfer offers one source. In vitro fer-
tilization is a second source.66 For some who oppose embryonic stem 
cell research, all sources of human embryos for research are contro-
versial. Recently, however, the use of cloning to obtain embryonic 
stem cells has been framed by legislative bodies, including Con-
gress,67 and by the public media reporting on legislative develop-
ments, as especially problematic.68 Some who oppose research on em-
bryonic stem cells have sketched disquieting visions of reproductive 
cloning and have suggested that research cloning will create a slip-
pery slope leading to reproductive cloning and to a variety of related 
aberrations.69 Others opposing cloning for research argue that any 
sort of cloning using human DNA is inherently anathema.70 Such 
fears were fueled in early 2003, with the unsupported claim by Clo-
naid, a company founded by a religious sect called the Raelians, that 
it had successfully produced a human clone.71  
                                                                                                                      
 65. Stem cells have been isolated from embryos, fetuses, and from adult cells, espe-
cially bone marrow, fat tissue, the central nervous system, and the liver. Id. It is not yet 
clear whether adult stem cells have the same capacity to differentiate into other cells as do 
embryonic stem cells. John A. Balint, Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research, 65 ALB. L. REV. 
729, 731-32 (2002) (indicating embryos for research could be obtained from spare embryos 
after reproductive in vitro fertilization (IVF)). 
 66. Some embryos are created through IVF, specifically for research. Others fall 
within the category of spare embryos, created for reproduction but not needed for that pur-
pose. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 9-10. A further source of embryos that can be used in 
stem cell research may result from the process of parthenogenesis. This process involves 
stimulating unfertilized eggs to divide so that they contain the full complement of chromo-
somes usually found in the relevant species. Parthenogenesis has led to live offspring in 
the case of amphibians, but not in the case of mammals. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING 
INQUIRY, supra note 50, at 44. It is not yet certain that cloned stem cells from partheno-
genesis can be reprogrammed correctly. Id. In late 2002, Ian Wilmut, who cloned Dolly, 
applied to the British government for the right to experiment with parthenogenesis. Steve 
Connor, Dolly ‘Dad’ Eyes Human Eggs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 26, 2002, at 19.  
 67. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
 68. See, e.g., Howard Markel, Weighing Medical Ethics for Many Years to Come, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 2002, at F6; Dave Weldon (R.-Fla.), Editorial, Cloning and Congress, WASH. 
POST, June 19, 2002, at A20; Marcia Coyle, As the Senate Prepares to Ban Some or All 
Cloning, NAT’L L.J., May 15, 2002; Kristen Philipkoski, Death Knell to Cloning Movement?, 
WIRED NEWS, Jan. 26, 2002, at http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,50042,00.html. 
 69. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50 (noting that clon-
ing for biomedical research will “open[] the door to other moral hazards, such as cloning-to-
produce-children or research on later-stage human embryos and fetuses”). In late 2001, 
Advanced Cell Technology again intensified the debate about cloning when it announced it 
had cloned a human embryo. Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack of the Clones and the Is-
sues of Clones, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 1 (May 10, 2002) at http:// 
www.stlr.org/html/volume3/lesko.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). 
 70. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50 (describing cloning for bio-
medical research as “disquieting” because it uses “seeds of the next generation as mere raw 
material for satisfying the needs of our own”). 
 71. Gina Kolata, The Promise of Therapeutic Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 4, at 
4. Scientists expressed concern that legislators and the public would fail to recognize the 
difference between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. Id. 
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 Controversy about the production of embryos for research through 
cloning in particular, has galvanized strong social and legal re-
sponses72 and has resulted in widespread confusion about the differ-
ences between non-reproductive cloning73 and research on pluripo-
tent stem cells.74 Public media, lawmakers, social theorists, and the 
public at large have contributed to the confusion between non-
reproductive cloning and stem cell research.75  
 The debate about cloning intensified in 1998 when Advanced Cell 
Technology, a Massachusetts biotechnology company, announced 
that it had fused a human somatic cell with a cow ovum.76 This ren-
dered the possibility of human cloning real and reinforced fears that 
cloning would eventually be used to produce unsettling chimeras 
such as a cow-person.77 Yet, the stunning promise 78 (or hype, depend-
ing on perspective) of embryonic stem cell research79 has galvanized a 
wide set of responses favoring cloning for research.80 In the few years 
since the isolation of embryonic stem cells in 1998,81 Congress82 and 
state legislatures83 have entertained a variety of bills aimed at ban-
ning or regulating human cloning, several bioethics bodies have re-
leased reports on cloning and/or on stem cell research,84 and a wide 
                                                                                                                      
 72. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
 73. Nuclear transfer involves replacing the nucleus of an embryonic cell with a nu-
cleus taken from any other cell (somatic or embryonic). DEREK MORGAN, ISSUES IN 
MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 187 (2001).  
 74. Okarma, supra note 64, at 5 (indicating embryonic stem cells are termed pluripo-
tent because of their capacity to differentiate into all of the cells of the human body). Toti-
potent cells are differentiated from pluripotent cells by the capacity of the latter to be di-
rectly implanted into a woman’s uterus and grow into a fetus. Wolpe & McGee, supra note 
2, at 188-89. 
 75. See Wolpe & McGee, supra note 2, at 187-88. Human reproductive cloning that is 
cloning to create a baby, has been widely condemned and feared. See id. at 188. The au-
thors refer to politicians who opposed embryonic stem cell research as a slippery slope to-
ward human cloning. Id. For instance, Congressman Jay Dickey (R.-Ark.) asserted: 
[t]here are no instances in which I feel the ban on federally funded research on 
human embryos should be lifted. The language of the ban prevents taxpayer 
funding for bizarre experiments, such as cloning. Eventually, I could see the em-
bryonic stem cell technology going in this direction. 
Id. (citing D. Butler, Breakthrough Stirs US Embryo Debate, 396 NATURE 104 (1998)). 
 76. Research using embryonic stem cells may lead to treatments for conditions result-
ing from cell malfunction, including diseases such as Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, and 
Alzheimer’s. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 19. 
 77. Nicholas Wade, Researchers Claim Embryonic Cell Mix of Human and Cow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at A1. 
 78. See id. 
 79. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50, at 20-21. 
 80. See infra notes 85, 87-88 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Thomson et al., supra note 1, at 1145. 
 82. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50, at 21-22 (summarizing 
bills in Congress). 
 83. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Washington Not Alone in Cell Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2001, at A12. 
 84. See, e.g., NBAC 1999, supra note 62. 
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variety of public interest groups have become active in the debate, 
variously favoring or condemning cloning and embryonic research.85  
 The promise of embryonic stem cell research may not be fulfilled 
for many years, or at all.86 But the possibilities of treatments and 
cures for fatal illnesses and debilitating disabilities, as well as the 
enormous sums of money likely to flow to the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries if the promise of the research is actual-
ized, have stimulated public and governmental support for therapeu-
tic cloning and embryonic stem cell research.87 A fairly effective pro-
research campaign was constructed in the face of strong opposition 
from an alliance of pro-life adherents and others, largely drawn from 
the camp of neo-conservatives, who oppose cloning because it “dehu-
manizes human life.”88 In the resulting controversy, old social and po-
litical alliances are being readjusted, underlying agendas are being 
unmasked and realigned, and the embryo-as-symbol is being 
reconstructed. 
III.   AT STAKE IN THE DEBATE ABOUT ABORTION: EMBRYOS AND 
BEYOND 
 The politics of abortion have molded the concerns and temper of 
the debate about embryonic research. Thus, in order to understand 
public responses to embryonic research and cloning for the produc-
tion of research embryos, it is necessary first to understand the his-
tory of ideas that shaped the politics of abortion89 during the nine-
                                                                                                                      
 85. Those lobbying in support of therapeutic cloning for the production of embryonic 
stem cells include representatives of the biotechnology industry, patient groups, and scien-
tific societies. Aaron Zitner, The Nation: Cloning Receives a Makeover Politics: Nuances of 
Language Helped Reframe the Debate and Derail an All-Out Ban in Congress, L.A. TIMES, 
June 17, 2002, at A1. Those opposing cloning have, for the most part come from groups op-
posing abortion. See id. (quoting Douglas Johnson of National Right to Life Committee). In 
addition, a group of conservative intellectuals, not connected to pro-life groups, have ac-
tively opposed therapeutic cloning. See Chris Mooney, The Future Is Later, AM. PROSPECT, 
July 15, 2002, at 10 (considering position of Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass and other neo-
conservatives on cloning and embryonic research). 
 86. Heather Johnson Kukla, Note, Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Ethical Justifi-
cation, 90 GEO. L.J. 503, 507 (2002) (citing various sources). In fact, it now appears to some 
scientists that both therapeutic cloning and the use of stem cells to cure illness and disabil-
ity are unlikely to be actualized for some time. In early 2003, Gina Kolata reported that 
“almost all researchers, when questioned, confess that such accomplishments [as the use of 
therapeutic cloning to cure diseases] are more dream than reality.” Kolata, supra note 71, 
§ 4, at 7. 
 87. Zitner, supra note 85, at A1. 
 88. Ramesh Ponnuru, “Checks and Balances,” NAT’L REV. ONLINE, (July 12, 2002) at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/ponnuru/ponnuru071202.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2003). 
 89. This Article aims to delineate the ideological implications of arguments about em-
bryonic or fetal life for two broad social debates in American society. Thus, in the context of 
this Article, differences between embryos and fetuses are of less importance than they may 
be for scientists, theologians, or pregnant women. For scientists, embryos become fetuses 
at about eight weeks of gestation. Only in the last half of the twentieth century did it be-
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teenth and twentieth centuries. Exploration of that ideological his-
tory suggests a significant irony at the heart of the debate about 
abortion. 
 That debate developed during the middle years of the nineteenth 
century. From the start, it more or less openly paralleled a larger de-
bate about the meaning of family and the scope of family relation-
ships. Although the right to abortion was not a central principal of 
the feminist movement until the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury,90 those who opposed abortion in the nineteenth century (and 
later) also strongly tended to favor the preservation of distinct gen-
der roles and to view woman as the preserver of hearth and home—
as suited by nature to serve her husband and to care for their chil-
dren.91 In the late twentieth century, especially in the years sur-
rounding Roe v. Wade,92 that correlation became explicit. By the last 
decades of the twentieth century, however, as the American family 
almost visibly jettisoned the incidents of traditional domestic life, 
those who opposed abortion relied increasingly on arguments that 
stressed the sanctity of fetal and embryonic life. Concomitantly, they 
relied less often, at least in public debate, on arguments about the 
sanctity of traditional family life.93  
 The attribution of personhood to embryos occurred only in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.94 But most of those who actively 
participated in the right-to-life movement in the aftermath of Roe 
simply assumed that embryos were children and that abortion was 
murder.95 This assumption did not become the central tenet of the 
right-to-life movement, eclipsing rhetoric about family life (including 
rhetoric about the importance of preserving gender differences), until 
the last decades of the twentieth century. By then, a majority of 
Americans were, in fact, living in families that no longer reflected 
traditional understandings of the domestic arena.96 And so, by this 
time, pro-life adherents were compelled, as a practical matter, to 
seek alternative modes of furthering their cause. Developing a plat-
form that emphasized the morality of safeguarding embryonic life 
(rather than the morality of safeguarding traditional family life) 
served the movement well. 
                                                                                                                      
come comparatively easy to obtain early embryos for research. Before the advent of in vitro 
fertilization, most embryos available for scientific research were the products of miscar-
riages and were thus not living. Morgan, supra note 3, at 50. 
 90. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 112-13 (1984). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 93. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text. 
 95. LUKER, supra note 90, at 128 (describing emergence of right-to-life movement). 
 96. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
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 This Part delineates the ideological contours of the debate about 
abortion, and situates that debate within its wider ideological his-
tory—one concerned with the scope of the family arena, the compara-
tive significance of autonomous individuality and of community, the 
role and status of women, and the meaning of personhood. This Part 
suggests that the debate about abortion during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries reflected shifting understandings of personhood 
and family life that developed during the same period. 
A.   “Abortion Politics” in the Nineteenth and Early  
Twentieth Centuries 
 In the United States, abortion was not widely criminalized until 
the second half of the nineteenth century.97 Before the Civil War, 
abortion was supported by custom and public policy.98 Under common 
law, abortion was not a crime until quickening, the stage of preg-
nancy at which a woman first felt fetal movements (generally the 
first half of the second trimester).99 The politics of abortion developed 
as part of a broad set of social movements that aimed variously to 
oppose gender equality, sexual freedom, and the displacement of 
faith by modern rationalism. 
1.   The Concept of Fetal Life 
 The sanctification of fetal life was part of that opposition from the 
middle of the nineteenth century, although it did not become the es-
sential tenet of pro-life groups for over a century. After the Civil War, 
a variety of voices—all supportive of the nascent movement to crimi-
nalize abortion—proclaimed the sanctity of fetal life. In 1869, Pope 
Pius IX rejected the Augustinian view that ensoulment occurs at 
forty days after conception,100 and proclaimed that a fetus gains a 
                                                                                                                      
 97. JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 253-59 (1994). Some states passed laws restricting abortion in the mid-
dle decades of the nineteenth century, but when these laws were challenged in court, the 
majority of state courts upheld the common law tradition of allowing abortion. Id. at 254 
(citing Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Abortion Movement and the AMA, 1850-1880, in 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA (1985)). Beginning in 
the 1860s, however, states successfully passed restrictive abortion statutes. Id. at 254-55 
(citing JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978) and Smith-Rosenberg, supra). Moreover, states criminalized 
mailing products or information regarding abortion or contraception. Id. at 255. And in 
1873, Congress passed a law (known as the Comstock Law) prohibiting mailing or import-
ing “any article whatever for the prevention of conception, or for causing unlawful abor-
tion.” Id. at 255-56 (citation omitted). 
 98. See BRODIE, supra note 97, at 253. 
 99. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regu-
lation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 281-82 (1992) (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-36 (1973) and MOHR, supra note 97, at 3). 
 100. See Balint, supra note 65, at 735 (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. ET AL., THE 
MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 38-39 (John T. Noonan, Jr. 
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soul (and thus becomes a full person) at conception.101 After this proc-
lamation, the Church classified all abortions as murder.102 In the 
same year, a council of bishops, meeting in Baltimore, condemned 
abortion.103 Abortion, in the council’s view, was no different than “the 
killing of a child after birth.”104  
 The Church’s strong public position about abortion served as a 
condemnation of modern rationalism, inducing the rejection of 
faith.105 For the Church, opposing abortion was part of a more gen-
eral opposition to modernization. At stake was the future of a vener-
able universe of power and belief. That universe was grounded in 
faith; it prized hierarchy and status and it frowned upon autonomous 
choice for almost everyone. For the Church, the controversy over 
abortion became, in effect, a last stand in a larger battle to safeguard 
a vanishing world of social privilege, political power, and religious 
faith. 
 During the same years that the Catholic Church publicized its 
new position about the status of fetal life, American physicians de-
veloped a similar position from the perspective of science rather than 
religion. They laid the groundwork for a popular vision of fetus-as-
child, premised not on faith, but on fact.106 The nineteenth-century 
medical community was motivated by interests beyond those of sci-
ence. The community hoped to upgrade the status of the profession, 
and toward that end, to eliminate competition from alternative 
healthcare practitioners.107 By defining fetuses as people, the profes-
sion laid claim to an exclusive ability to treat pregnant women, 
which helped define physicians as better trained and more capable 
                                                                                                                      
ed., 1970)). The Augustinian view was shared by Thomas Aquinas and by Popes Innocent 
III (in 1211) and Gregory XIII (in 1550). Id. (citing NOONAN ET AL., supra, at 20-23, 27). See 
also infra note 101 (noting the Church’s identification of conception with ensoulment in 
1869). 
 101. John T. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF 
ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES supra note 100, at 39. In Apostolicace 
Sedis, Pius IX redrafted the Church’s assertion about excommunication for abortion by 
omitting language that appeared in an earlier pronouncement about abortion of an en-
souled fetus. This omission by Pius IX was taken as an assertion that ensoulment began at 
conception insofar as any other interpretation “would be making an old law more onerous, 
which is contrary to the intent of the constitution.” Id. at 39 n.133 (quoting Anonymous, De 
Animatione Foetus, 11 NOUVELLE REVUE THEOLOGIQUE 186 (1879)). 
 102. Id. at 39 (citing THEOLOGIE MORALE A L’USAGE DES CURES ET DES CONFESSEURS 
(1874)). 
 103.  MOHR, supra note 97, at 186. 
 104. Id. (citation omitted). 
 105. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE 
CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS 389-91 (1965) (speaking, in particular, of the 
spread of contraception in France in the nineteenth century). 
 106. Balint, supra note 65, at 735. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (not-
ing the Church’s identification of conception with ensoulment in 1869). 
 107. LUKER, supra note 90, at 28.  
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than alternative practitioners of the day.108 Thus, nineteenth-century 
physicians provided scientific backing for claims about the moral 
status of the fetus.109 A century later, these claims were incorporated 
at the center of the ideological platform of the pro-life movement.110  
 Dr. Hugh Hodge, a medical school professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania, played an important role in the nineteenth-century ef-
fort. He excoriated abortion on the ground that the fetus was a think-
ing, moral being.111 Hodge described the fetus as an “independent be-
ing” with “independent powers.”112 A couple of decades later, Dr. 
Stephen Tracy substantiated the claim that the fetus is a “human be-
ing” by recording the knowledge of “well-informed medical men”:113 
At forty-five days, the form of the child is very distinct, and it is 
not termed a fetus. The head is very large; the eyes, mouth, and 
nose are to be distinguished; the hands and arms are in the middle 
of its length, fingers distinct . . . at two months, all the parts of the 
child are present . . . the fingers and toes are distinct. At three 
months, the heart pulsates strongly, and the principal vessels 
carry red blood.114 
In the same year (1869) that Pius IX proclaimed the personhood of 
fetuses, Hodge published Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion.115 There, he 
summarized his medical assessment of the fetus’ ontological status 
as a full person. 
 The convergence of religious and scientific authority with regard 
to fetal status significantly strengthened the movement to outlaw 
abortion in the nineteenth century. However, at that time, the onto-
logical status of the fetus was one among a wide set of concerns and 
assertions publicized by abortion opponents.  
2.   Abortion, Gender, and Families 
 Nineteenth-century abortion opponents constructed the notion of 
the embryo-as-person, but their agenda was grounded in a vision of 
traditional family life and gender roles.116 “The true wife,” explained 
Dr. Horatio R. Storer, a leader of the physician’s campaign against 
                                                                                                                      
 108. Id. at 18-20. 
 109. See BRODIE, supra note 97, at 87, 266-67. 
 110. Id. at 88; see also Siegel, supra note 99, at 325-26.  
 111. See BRODIE, supra note 97, at 266. 
 112. MARVIN OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA 
113 (1992) (citing HUGH HODGE, FOETICIDE, OR CRIMINAL ABORTION 9-10 (1869)). 
 113. Id. at 114 (quoting STEPHEN TRACY, THE MOTHER AND HER OFFSPRING 109 
(1853)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. HODGE, supra note 112. 
 116. LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 11 (1997). 
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abortion, rejected “undue power in public life . . . [and] undue control 
in domestic affairs . . . [as] privileges not her own.”117  
 Anti-abortion rhetoric included express warnings about the disso-
lution of family life. Abortion became synonymous with the failure of 
women to effect their natural duties as wives and mothers.118 The 
very notion of abortion provided a powerful, negative symbol of inde-
pendent women—of both the prostitute who stood outside family life 
and the wife who stood inside but rejected the sacred demands of 
moral decency. Abortion symbolized the threat of sexual excesses, 
and in this vein, it stood for the desecration of sacred truth and the 
destruction of public morality.119 It symbolized efforts to undermine a 
domestic sphere populated by loving mothers, presumed to care self-
lessly for their treasured children,120 and wives, expected to provide 
sanctuary to their presumptively beleaguered husbands, viewed as 
returning each evening from the hardships of the marketplace to the 
comfort of home.121 Such images suggested that women who failed to 
fulfill their proper role within the domestic arena threatened the 
backbone of social and economic life. Opposition to abortion reaf-
firmed that view.122 
                                                                                                                      
 117. Id. at 11 (quoting HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, IS IT I? A BOOK FOR EVERY MAN 
1886 (reprinted as A PROPER BOSTONIAN ON SEX AND BIRTH CONTROL 1934)). Members of 
the medical profession were heavily represented among the important nineteenth-century 
anti-abortionists. Among other things, they sought to exclude women from the profession. 
Id. at 11. 
 118. “[F]or the married shirk, who disregards her divinely-ordained duty,” wrote Au-
gustus Gardner in 1876 (distinguishing this sort of woman from the “poor,” “seduced” 
“girl”), “we have nothing but contempt, even if she be the lordly woman of fashion, clothed 
in purple and fine fashion.” MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 171 (1985) 
(quoting AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND HEALTH 
AND THEIR EFFECTS UPON THE FATHER, MOTHER, AND THE CHILD 117 (1876)). Clearly, the 
most contemptuous of women was she who could easily have been a devoted wife and 
mother but instead chose other paths (symbolized by the married shirk who chose abor-
tion).  
 119. See id. at 176 (noting Anthony Comstock’s role as protector of public morals). 
 120. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL 
VALUE OF CHILDREN 3 (1985) (explaining that during the nineteenth century, children be-
came “economically worthless” but “emotionally priceless”). 
 121. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 50-52 (1988) (By mid-nineteenth century, “[t]he mid-
dle-class husband was expected to be the breadwinner for the family. Instead of participat-
ing in domestic industries, the middle-class wife was expected to devote herself full-time to 
keeping house and raising children.”). The nineteenth-century wife was viewed ideally as a 
nurturer and protector of sacred, familial values. A popular nineteenth-century magazine 
for women, Ladies’ Magazine, characterized woman as “forming the future patriot, states-
man, or enemy of his country, [but] more than this, she is sowing the seeds of virtue or vice 
which will fit him for Heaven or for eternal misery.” MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S 
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 
52-53 (1994) (quoting MAXINE MARGOLIS, MOTHERS AND SUCH: VIEWS OF AMERICAN 
WOMEN AND WHY THEY CHANGED 38 (1984)). 
 122. See LUKER, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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 But nineteenth-century responses to abortion were not uniform. 
Opinions about abortion reflected tensions at the center of the ideol-
ogy of traditional family life. Not everyone viewed abortion with dis-
gust. For some, abortion and contraception represented a new, posi-
tive vision of independence within the home because these options 
provided for reproductive choice within the context of affective mar-
riage.123 This vision indicates that the modernization of family life 
began, not in the 1960s (when it became manifest), but over a cen-
tury earlier.124 
 Whatever nineteenth-century Americans believed about abortion 
and contraception, family size declined sharply during the century. 
Birth rates fell dramatically, from about seven children to a family at 
the start of the century to less than four at the century’s end.125 The 
decrease was not due to external disasters such as famine or war.126 
Rather, it was a product of parental choice and was effected through 
use of contraception and abortion.127 By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, abortion, once practiced largely by desperate women (moti-
vated by poverty or guilt about the consequences of extra-marital 
sexuality), became important as a practical matter to a new commu-
nity of women.128 White, middle-class women, not driven by the pres-
sures of poverty or by fears of being revealed as sinful, sought abor-
tion in order to preserve (or more accurately, perhaps, to create) 
families that reflected the nineteenth-century ideal of two parents, 
living together with their cherished (and chosen) children.129 
 Thus in the nineteenth century, with the so-called traditional 
family still in its ascendancy, but with the harbingers of its trans-
formation already present in society’s readiness to embrace notions 
of independence and autonomy in defining the spousal relationship, 
opposing conceptions of abortion reflected opposing conceptions of 
family. Abortion was deplored by many as an assault on family life, 
                                                                                                                      
 123. GROSSBERG, supra note 118, at 170-71. 
 124. The process of modernization within the domestic arena during the nineteenth 
century is well illustrated by the promulgation of the Married Women’s Property Acts. See 
LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 13 (2d ed. 2000); see also e.g., Illinois 
Married Women’s Act, 1861 Ill. Laws 1433 (providing that “all property, both real and per-
sonal, belonging to any married woman, as her sole and separate property . . . shall, not-
withstanding her marriage, be and remain, during coverture, her sole and separate prop-
erty”). 
 125. N.E.H. HULL & PETER C. HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS 
CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (2001). 
 126. Id. at 25-26. 
 127. Id. at 26. 
 128. Id. at 25-26. 
 129. Id. (The “growing fondness for children” in nineteenth-century America “did not 
lead to larger families. In fact, the reverse was true.”). Hull & Hoffer explained that “[a]s 
the investment in love and family funds in each child increased, and the mortality of chil-
dren declined, parents opted for fewer children.” Id. at 25. 
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but abortion also provided an important private option in the con-
struction of companionate family life.130 
B.   “Abortion Politics” in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century: 
Text and Pretext131 
 In the late twentieth century, as in the previous century and a 
half, the debate about abortion reflected a more general debate about 
the scope of family life and the parameters of personhood. But by this 
time, those concerned with safeguarding traditional family life faced 
a society that had largely abandoned that form of family in favor of 
families constructed through negotiation and choice.132  
 Although the traditional family (forged in the early years of the 
Industrial Revolution) appeared to find its elixir in the middle dec-
ades of the twentieth century, signs (though often subtle and rarely 
decisive) appeared soon after World War II that indicated that the 
traditional family was under siege. By the 1960s, the once clear 
boundaries between public life (in the marketplace) and private life 
(in the home) had begun to blur.133 As part of this shift, discussions of 
sexuality and reproductive matters, understood in earlier decades as 
almost shamefully private, entered public discourse.134 And by the 
last decades of the twentieth century, the domestic arena had altered 
significantly both in fact and in social conception.135 At least with re-
gard to adults within families, society and the law widely prized 
autonomous individuality and negotiated choice.136 As a result, it be-
came less and less effective, as a strategic matter, to premise opposi-
tion to abortion on the importance of preserving traditional family 
life. The audience for that sort of argument had grown thin. 
 This Section suggests that, as a result, abortion opponents focused 
less often, at least in public discourse, on the connection between 
                                                                                                                      
 130. GROSSBERG, supra note 118, at 170-71. 
 131. This Article differentiates text from pretext in order to explore the shifting foci of 
the social debate about abortion. The differentiation is not intended to suggest that beliefs 
and agendas delineated in this Article as pretext are not real or that they do not seem mo-
mentous to those voicing them. Only pretexts that are also convincing in their own terms 
are effective. In the context of social and political debate, effective pretexts must also be 
convincing in some regard or at least present stumbling blocks to sociopolitical antago-
nists. Moreover, pretexts may, over time, become texts. Arguably, for instance, shifting 
understandings and uses of the embryo in disputes about abortion and stem cell research 
illustrate that process. Or at any rate, in the debate about abortion, the text (safeguarding 
traditional family life) has been subsumed, at least in public debate, by the pretext (the on-
tological status of the embryo). 
 132. See infra notes 134-67 and accompanying text. 
 133. See BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES 1-20 (2001). 
 134. LUKER, supra note 90, at 107-18. 
 135. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 34-35 
(1993) (defining the modern family in terms of increased autonomy among family mem-
bers). 
 136. See id. 
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abortion and the weakening of traditional family life. Instead, the 
pro-life movement grew silent about the agenda around which the 
debate about abortion had developed and focused more and more of-
ten on the status of fetuses and embryos. Thus, for pro-life adher-
ents, arguments about the sanctity of fetal and embryonic life en-
compassed (while displacing) arguments about the value of tradi-
tional family life.  
 This Section first describes the transformation of the American 
family during the last half of the twentieth century and the wide-
spread acceptance of that change within society and, in particular, 
within the law. It then describes the consequent shift in strategy 
among abortion opponents as they shifted focus, at least in public 
discourse. Pro-life discourse about the value of traditional family life 
was eclipsed by pro-life discourse about the value of fetal and embry-
onic life.  
1.   Accepting the “Modern” Family 
 By the second half of the twentieth century, Americans widely 
prized familial relationships, at least between adults, that mirrored 
the values of the nineteenth century marketplace rather than those 
associated with the nineteenth-century home.137 Among other things, 
this new family provided for negotiation and choice in place of 
predetermined roles, it preferred autonomous individuality to com-
munal dependency, and it valued equality rather than fixed, hierar-
chical statuses for family members. 
(a)   Shifts in Family Law 
 This new understanding of family was reflected in a wide variety 
of legal changes that occurred during the same period. For instance, 
beginning in the early 1970s, courts recognized and agreed to enforce 
prenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce;138 previously 
these agreements were deemed violative of public policy.139 In the 
same period, lawmakers increasingly recognized cohabitation agree-
ments between individuals who chose not to marry.140 And perhaps 
                                                                                                                      
 137. See id. at 34-36. 
 138. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 
S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1982).  
 139. A number of the early decisions recognizing prenuptial agreements in contempla-
tion of divorce justified that step by referring to sociological changes in the character of 
families. In Posner, the court took judicial notice of the disturbing rate of divorce given the 
rate of marriage. See 233 So. 2d at 394.  
 140. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing nonmeretri-
cious contracts between unmarried cohabitants); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 
(N.Y. 1980) (recognizing express agreements between unmarried cohabitants); Cohabita-
tion: property and financial agreements, MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (1988). 
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most importantly, beginning in California in 1969,141 every state 
amended its divorce law by the mid-1980s to provide for some form of 
divorce not dependent on accusations of fault.142 Many states added 
new no-fault options to the traditional fault grounds for divorce (in-
cluding adultery, cruelty, and desertion);143 others abandoned tradi-
tional divorce rules and provided for divorce on grounds of marital 
breakdown.144  
 Moreover, the transformation of the American family in the last 
decades of the twentieth century is reflected in a set of Supreme 
Court decisions145 that implicitly acknowledge a vision of families 
premised on autonomous individuality—a vision of family members 
free to negotiate the terms of familial relationships and to define 
their sexual and reproductive lives without reference to the con-
straints of traditional family life. 
(b)   Individualism, Autonomy, and Family Jurisprudence 
 Griswold v. Connecticut,146 decided in 1965, was among the first 
cases that suggested the Court’s interest in, and its mode of respond-
ing to, disputes about domestic (and especially reproductive) matters. 
In Griswold, the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited the 
distribution of contraception.147 Six years later, in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,148 another case involving state limitations on contraception, 
                                                                                                                      
 141. See Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312 (first state statute to pro-
vide for no-fault divorce). See generally Doris Jonas Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the 
American Jurisdictions (as of June 1, 1974), 8 FAM. L.Q. 401 (1974) (listing grounds for di-
vorce by state). 
 142. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 78 (1987) (observ-
ing that by 1985 all states had some sort of no-fault provision for divorce).  
 143. Id. at 78-79. 
 144. See id. at 78. 
 145. Changes in constitutional jurisprudence during the second half of the twentieth 
century facilitated the Court’s entertaining of family issues. That jurisprudence provided 
for applying the equal protection and due process protections of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to family matters. See EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY 13 (1986) (pointing to importance of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) in beginning this process). 
 Traditionally, federal courts did not often hear cases involving family matters, in large 
part this followed from the unavailability of diversity jurisdiction in domestic cases. See 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698-99 (1992). The absence of diversity jurisdiction 
has broadly limited the path to federal courts for family disputants. They can only be 
heard in federal court if a federal statute is at stake or a constitutional question is present. 
Originally, the absence of diversity jurisdiction in family cases was attributed to dicta in 
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdic-
tion in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of 
alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, 
or to one from bed and board.”). In 1992, the Court decided that the exception was predi-
cated on the Judiciary Act of 1789. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 698-99.  
 146. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 147. Id. at 485-86. 
 148. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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the Court went much farther than it had in Griswold in delineating 
and justifying a new vision of family. In Eisenstadt, the Court invali-
dated a Massachusetts statute that limited the distribution of con-
traceptives to unmarried people.149 If Griswold is remarkable for its 
jurisprudential extension of spouses’ constitutional right to privacy, 
Eisenstadt is remarkable for its openly modern assumption about the 
parameters of family life. In Griswold, the Court predicated its deci-
sion on the sanctity of the marital unit. Marriage, explained Justice 
Douglas, “is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en-
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”150 In stunning 
contrast, and without any meta-commentary about changes in the 
parameters of marriage since Griswold, the Court in Eisenstadt de-
scribed marriage as a partnership rather than a communal union 
and as a fungible choice open to continuous revisitation rather than 
as a relationship imbued with sacred truth. In Eisenstadt, Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, explained: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered 
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa-
tion of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.151 
Thus, Justice Brennan, perhaps unconsciously, acknowledged an es-
sentially new form of family. No longer was the law to view marriage 
as the sacred center of family life, with fixed parameters and familiar 
roles. After Eisenstadt, families were centered, in the eyes of the law 
as in the eyes of much of society, in the choices of individual family 
members.152 Griswold and Eisenstadt together laid the jurispruden-
tial grounding for the Court’s decision in Roe.153 
                                                                                                                      
 149. Id. at 454-55. 
 150. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 151. 405 U.S. at 453. 
 152. The still unresolved ideological struggle about family in the United States today 
focuses not on the relationship between adults within families but on the dimensions and 
meaning of the parent-child relationship. In the last three and a half decades, the Court 
has variously viewed children as autonomous individuals, for example, Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969), which ex-
tended First Amendment rights to school students under certain circumstances; In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967), which granted constitutional rights to children in delin-
quency proceedings, or as unequal dependents, for example, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 
616-17 (1979), which upheld state law permitting parents to commit children voluntarily to 
state mental hospitals. In a number of cases, the Court has been openly hesitant to classi-
fying children clearly in either category, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992), which allowed the state to require a 
minor girl seeking abortion to obtain informed consent from a parent or from a court; Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979), which invalidated a Massachusetts statute requir-
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(c)   Roe v. Wade154 
 Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, reflects the notion of privacy as a 
constitutional right (articulated in Griswold), and it reflects the vi-
sion of family underlying Eisenstadt. Roe is, however, more compli-
cated than these earlier decisions about reproductive freedom, 
largely because the interests of the pregnant woman are balanced 
against those of the developing fetus. For instance, Roe reflects 
Eisenstadt’s endorsement of individual choice, but it also depends on 
an understanding of pregnant women (elaborated on the basis of the 
Court’s trimester scheme) as less free to make their own reproductive 
choices than is the case for those deciding about whether and when 
to use contraception. Moreover, Roe, in its dependence on a trimester 
scheme, reflects an understanding of pregnancy that harmonizes 
more fully with a traditional common law understanding of preg-
nancy than with the understanding that emerged in the mid-
nineteenth century.155  
 The limited right to abortion, first delineated in Roe, was predi-
cated in part on an understanding of pregnant women as autono-
mous individuals, free to make basic decisions about their bodies 
without state interference, and in this sense, represents an extension 
of the vision of family members articulated in Eisenstadt.156 Yet, in 
Roe, the Court was less ready than in Eisenstadt to protect unfet-
tered individualism. The Roe Court refrained from defining embryos 
explicitly, but the Court openly balanced the interests of the preg-
nant woman against the interests of the developing fetus.157 
 Similarly, in the abortion cases that followed Roe, the Court has 
been less ready than in other cases involving adults’ familial choices 
to jettison the claims of tradition and to provide firmly for autonomy 
and choice. In consequence, the right of autonomous adults within 
family settings, so clearly prized and protected in Eisenstadt, is ex-
                                                                                                                      
ing a minor girl seeking abortion to obtain parental consent and did not provide for a judi-
cial bypass option.  
 153. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 154. Id.  
 155. LUKER, supra note 90, at 14. 
 156. See 405 U.S. at 453. Roe also developed from the jurisprudence developed in Gris-
wold. The link between contraception, protected in Griswold, and abortion, protected in 
Roe, is clear. David Garrow observes that before Griswold, abortion reformers focused on 
liberalizing state abortion statues. David Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: 
A Historical Perspective, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 833 (1999). 
 157. 410 U.S. at 159. The Court noted that  
 [t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an em-
bryo and later, a fetus . . . . As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and ap-
propriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of 
health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly in-
volved. The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she pos-
sesses must be measured accordingly. 
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pressly balanced in the cases about abortion with concern for the 
status of the fetus.158 In the abortion cases, in contrast with most 
cases about familial and reproductive matters, the Court has con-
structed a framework that encompasses both arguments that value 
tradition and arguments that value modernity.159 The Court’s abor-
tion jurisprudence, far more than its responses to related familial 
matters (including contraception and divorce) that involve adults 
within families, has constructed a jurisprudential stage on which a 
clear voice favoring tradition in familial contexts (the voice of fetal 
interests) can be heard alongside a voice favoring modernity (the 
voice of a woman’s right to autonomy and choice).160 This jurispru-
dence suggests the dimensions of social debate about abortion, and it 
explains the increasing focus of pro-life adherents on the ontological 
status of embryos and fetuses in public debate. Ironically, that focus 
increasingly displaces claims about the value of traditional family re-
lationships (originally, the central concern of the pro-life move-
ment).161 
(d)   The Social Debate About Family 
 The Court’s abortion cases reflect, while standing somewhat apart 
from, other decisions about adults in families. Those decisions,162 re-
flecting the larger society, have assumed a view of adults within 
                                                                                                                      
 158. See, e.g., id.; Teresa Godwin Phelps, The Sound of Silence Breaking: Catholic 
Women, Abortion and the Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 547, 565 (1992) (noting that debate about 
abortion “is generally framed using rights language: the fetus or the woman has the supe-
rior right to life or to autonomy”). 
 159. Even outside the context of disputes about abortion, the Court has not always 
sided with modernity in cases questioning the limits of choice in familial relationships. For 
instance, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003), the Court upheld Georgia’s sodomy law, which criminalized 
sodomy between consenting adults. In Hardwick, however, the Court did not openly bal-
ance the interests of tradition against those of modernity and conclude that the balance fa-
vored the first. Rather, the Court concluded that the Constitution simply failed to “confer[] 
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” Id. at 190-91. 
 160. In cases involving children (in contrast with cases involving adults in family set-
tings), the Court has usually balanced the interests of tradition against those of modernity. 
These cases have often been confusing precisely because the Court has been unable to safe-
guard adults’ autonomous choices while simultaneously protecting children. For instance, 
in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000), the Court invalidated a state non-parental 
visitation statute as applied. The decision presumes childhood to be a fixed status that 
parents are free to regulate according to the contours of their familial lives, but reflects a 
confused understanding of family and of the parent-child relationship in particular. See 
Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 337, 369-92 (2002) (considering the assumptions underlying the Court’s decisions in 
Troxel). 
 161. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (invalidating state stat-
ute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating state statute prohibiting distribution of con-
traceptives to married people). 
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families as autonomous individuals, free to design the terms of their 
own relationships. By the end of the twentieth century, the so-called 
debate about family that had engaged society during the previous 
two centuries was weighted, if not firmly settled,163 in favor of the so-
called family of choice.164 
 For traditionalists (including many religious fundamentalists and 
political conservatives), arguments that depended on society’s assum-
ing the inherent value of old-fashioned families were becoming in-
creasingly ineffective.165 Divorce, smaller families, single-parent 
families, and families with two working parents had all become 
commonplace.166 Each of these changes reflected the increasingly 
large set of choices available to adults within families.167 As a result, 
it became more difficult to safeguard traditional family life (including 
status-based understandings of women) with direct appeals to its 
value, including fixed gender rolls that largely precluded choice.168 
                                                                                                                      
 163. American society did not reconstruct its notion of childhood or of the parent-child 
relationship in comparable terms. Thus, society continues to struggle with competing un-
derstandings of childhood and of the best forms of parental authority and responsibility. 
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (allowing courts to displace parental 
authority in sanctioning minor’s abortion decision); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIF-
FERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 271, 287-88 (1990) (considering 
various understandings of children as different from adults). 
 164. See, e.g., KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 73-75 
(1991) (noting the importance of choice rather than biology in construction of family bonds 
for gays and lesbians and thus providing a paradigm for importance of choice in construc-
tion of family bonds more generally). 
 165. By the end of the twentieth century, even traditionalists began to rely on the im-
portance of choice in the effort to safeguard traditional family life. For instance, several 
states passed laws in the late 1990s that granted couples contemplating marriage the op-
portunity to choose covenant marriage and thus, at least in theory, preclude the possibility 
of obtaining a no-fault divorce if the marriage failed. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 902-05 
(1998); 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 (West). These laws depend on the very modern no-
tion that adults should be free to choose the rules according to which their families are 
formed and structured. See infra note 188 (considering covenant marriage in greater de-
tail). 
 166. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT: BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW 
AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 15 (1991) (describing American families 
as having undergone “[d]ramatic social, demographic, and economic changes during the 
past 30 years”). 
 167. Relevant choices included, among others, the choice to use contraception, to di-
vorce or separate, to have children before or outside of marriage, to work outside the home, 
and to abandon one’s children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000) (plurality 
opinion) (noting that “[i]n 1996, children living with only one parent accounted for 28 per-
cent of all children under age 18 in the United States”) (citation omitted); Dolgin, supra 
note 160, at 348 n.40.  
 168. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63 (noting that “demographic changes of the past century 
make it difficult to speak of an average American family”); see also Siobnan Morrissey, The 
New Neighbors: Domestic Relations Law Struggles to Catch up with Changes in Family 
Life, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2002, at 37, 39 (charting change in makeup of U.S. households be-
tween 1970 and 2000). In 1970, about forty percent of U.S. households were composed of 
married couples with children. Id. In 2000, only about twenty-four percent were so com-
posed. Id. Moreover, Morrissey observes that at present, “America is largely a crazy quilt 
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The shifting temper of public debate about abortion reflects this 
change. Instead of focusing openly on the sanctity of woman as wife 
and mother, as their nineteenth-century counterparts did, abortion 
opponents after Roe increasingly shifted the focus of debate away 
from open condemnation of modern familial choices, especially those 
that implicated gender.  
 Focus on the embryo-as-person provided a rhetorical and strategic 
option. For many firmly committed to a pro-life position, this new fo-
cus masked an ideology committed to the preservation of traditional 
family life.169 For others, including those committed to the right to 
abortion, claims grounded in assessments of fetal and embryonic 
status became harder to dispute than claims that focused on familial 
choices, especially those of women.170 In short, the elaboration of ar-
guments about embryonic status, including the critique of abortion 
as murder, has proved powerful in public discourse. Rhetoric defining 
the embryo-as-person has, oddly perhaps, been assisted by the devel-
opment of imaging techniques such as ultrasonography that allow 
visualization of embryos and fetuses inside the womb.171 Thus, by the 
last decades of the twentieth century, the abortion debate had be-
come a debate about the status of embryos and fetuses. This theme 
has largely displaced the themes of the older abortion debate, which 
focused openly on the status of women and the scope of family life. 
2. The Shift in Abortion Rhetoric: The Debate About the 
Personhood of Embryos and Fetuses 
 Americans widely committed themselves in practice to modernity 
in family relationships, as they began to cohabit without marrying, to 
divorce without accusations of fault, and to define their relationships 
through contracts that they asked courts to interpret and enforce. In 
consequence, the pro-traditional-family agenda of the right-to-life 
movement became less effective simply because many people were 
choosing to define and construct their family relationships in terms 
                                                                                                                      
of one-parent households, blended families, singles, unmarried partnerships and same-sex 
unions that would have astonished” Americans of a generation ago. Id. at 38. 
 169. See LUKER, supra note 90, at 7-9 (noting that those engaged in the debate about 
abortion are, at bottom, debating “a notion of what they see as sacred and important”; “a 
decision about the moral status of the embryo is an implicit statement about the role of 
children and women in modern American society”). 
 170. See Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: 
A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 374, 390 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998) (noting 
taboo among feminists in exploration of fetal status). 
 171. Douglas Johnson, legislative director of the National Right to Life Committee, has 
explained that “[t]he new technologies create a window to the womb, which makes people 
much more cognizant of the humanity of the unborn child.” Robin Toner, The Abortion De-
bate, Stuck in Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, § 4, at 1. David Garrow, historian at Emory 
University, has noted, similarly, that “[w]e are a much more fetally aware society than we 
were when [Roe] came down.” Id. 
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that contradicted those prized by traditionalists.172 Anti-abortion 
publicists increasingly began to rely on assertions about fetal and 
embryonic status. Moreover, they publicized fetal images, often more 
powerful in public debate than words about fetuses. This shift from 
words to images was facilitated by new technologies that made it 
possible to visualize embryos and fetuses in utero.173 Thus, images of 
the fetus elided both the discomfort of those unwilling to actively 
oppose contraception, no-fault divorce, and nonmarital cohabitation 
and contradictions within the antiabortion movement itself.174 These 
images carried a powerful message to which pro-choice adherents 
rarely responded effectively.175 
 Even pro-choice feminists have tended to avoid discourse that in-
quires into the parameters of fetal and embryonic status.176 The 
gradualist interpretation of fetal development toward personhood 
held by many pro-choice advocates177 has made it difficult to explain 
the morality of aborting an 8-week fetus while hesitating to abort a 
38-week fetus. In consequence, feminists seek to avoid questions 
about embryonic and fetal status.178 Marsha Saxton refers to a “taboo 
in the feminist movement against discussing the fetus.”179 In short, 
antiabortionists have been more successful in forging their own coali-
tion and in responding to pro-choice adherents by stressing the sanc-
tity of fetal life than by presenting arguments about the immorality 
of divorce and contraception.  
 Yet, even as the rhetoric and public focus of the pro-life movement 
have changed, many who define themselves as pro-life continue to 
value gender differences, to attribute those differences to human na-
ture, and to assume that a woman’s proper role is the traditional one 
of stay-at-home mother, endowed (they assume) as no man could be, 
with a natural propensity to socialize and nurture children and to 
care for home and hearth.180 Further, many pro-life adherents view 
the family as a private arena that should ideally be free from state 
regulation. This position presumes that families are organic wholes, 
and thus state efforts to protect individual rights within family con-
texts are misguided. Many not only oppose constitutional protection 
                                                                                                                      
 172. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text; see infra notes 190-91 and accom-
panying text. 
 173. Carol A. Stabile, The Traffic in Fetuses, in FETAL SUBJECTS, FEMINIST POSITIONS, 
supra note 3, at 133. 
 174. Id. at 151. 
 175. See Saxton, supra note 170, at 380-81. 
 176. See id. (noting moral qualms among pro-choice adherents about multiple abor-
tions). 
 177. LUKER, supra note 90, at 180-81. 
 178. See Saxton, supra note 170, at 380-81. 
 179. Id. at 390. 
 180. See LUKER, supra note 90, at 159-63. 
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for the right of the individual to use contraception or to terminate a 
pregnancy, but also oppose legal provisions such as no-fault divorce 
rules, which allow family members to negotiate and define their own 
relationships.181 
 Kristin Luker, who studied abortion activists on both sides of the 
issue,182 explained that for most pro-life women,183 “their position on 
abortion is the ‘tip of the iceberg,’ a shorthand way of supporting and 
proclaiming not only a complex set of values but a given set of social 
resources as well.”184 Central to those values and social resources is 
an understanding of woman as home-maker, wife, and mother. But 
as public debate about abortion has focused, often it would seem 
almost exclusively, on arguments about the status of embryos and fe-
tuses, the legitimacy and future of an entire way of life appear to 
hinge on conclusions about embryonic and fetal life. 
 In fact, the debate about abortion, though often framed as a de-
bate about the status of embryonic and fetal life, is much more than 
that. At base, it is tantamount to a last stand for the preservation of 
traditional family life and the values and beliefs that sustained that 
form of family.185 Kristin Luker offers a similar reading of many pro-
life activists’ underlying concerns: 
[O]n an intimate level, the pro-life movement is women’s version of 
what was true of peasants in the Vendée, the part of France that 
remained Royalist during the French Revolution. Charles Tilly has 
argued that in the Vendée, traditional relationships between no-
bles and peasants were still mutually satisfying so that the “brave 
new world” of the French Revolution represented more loss than 
gain, and the peasants therefore resisted the changes the Revolu-
tion heralded. By the same logic, traditional relationships between 
men and women are still satisfying, rewarding, and meaningful for 
                                                                                                                      
 181. Id. at 209. 
 182. Luker studied committed activists in one state. However, she asserts her study “is 
probably a reasonably accurate picture of how abortion activists think and feel throughout 
the United States.” Id. at 256. 
 183. Luker interviewed at least one person from every important pro-life and pro-
choice group in California as well as abortion activists from six other states. Id. at 9. 
 184. Id. at 200. 
 185. More specifically, the abortion battle can also be understood as a last stand for the 
valuation of a world in which community was more important than individuality, status 
was more important than rights, and in which hierarchy was essential to the preservation 
of the social whole. The implications of this claim are somewhat different for different 
groups of antiabortion activists. For the Catholic Church, for instance, the debate about 
abortion has constituted a last stand for a battle aimed at saving an entire way of life that 
buttressed the power of the Church within sacred and secular realms. That way of life, 
largely constructed during feudal times, presumed, valued, and depended upon the preser-
vation of hierarchy and communal solidarity. For Protestant evangelicals and fundamen-
talists, in contrast, abortion has a more immediate referent. It has symbolized (and helped 
to effect) the transformation of family life in the twentieth century from a model that pre-
sumed set roles, identified through age and gender, to a model that values choice and free-
dom. 2 MARCH BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 283-84, 346 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1974). 
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pro-life women, and they therefore resist the lure of “liberation.” 
For pro-choice women, however, with their access to male re-
sources, a division of labor into the public world of work and the 
private world of home and hearth seems to promise only restriction 
to “second-class” citizenship.186 
Thus, Luker explained that for at least some women, commitment to 
the pro-life cause is a means of preserving a commitment to a uni-
verse encompassed by rapidly transforming socio-political forces. As 
the Royalist peasants in the Vendée committed themselves to tradi-
tion in the face of monumental social change, the pro-life women, 
whom Luker interviewed, commit themselves to a form of family and 
a view of women that have widely succumbed to alternative forms of 
family and views of gender. 
 For such pro-life women, and others affiliated with their cause, 
safeguarding a vision of embryonic and fetal humanity harmonizes 
with an underlying and more general set of moral goals. It is also of 
strategic value because for others now committed, though sometimes 
with lingering ambivalence, to a world that values families-of-choice, 
pro-life visions of the embryo and fetus can be discomforting.187  
 In consequence, as traditionalists have increasingly, though often 
implicitly rather than explicitly, conceded the debate about family to 
modernity, they have largely refrained from making concessions 
about abortion.188 In opposing abortion, traditionalists have been able 
to avoid express claims about the moral implications of disassociat-
ing family life from traditional forms. They have instead relied on 
arguments about the biological and theological status of embryos and 
fetuses.189 In opposing abortion (as is no longer the case, for instance, 
in opposing divorce or gender equality), traditionalists need not ap-
pear openly to gainsay the importance of equality and freedom. In 
the context of abortion, almost uniquely, traditionalists have con-
                                                                                                                      
 186. LUKER, supra note 90, at 201-02. 
 187. Saxton, supra note 170, at 384. 
 188. Traditionalists rely on modernity’s tools to affect their own agendas but have gen-
erally not recognized the implications of that reliance. So, for instance, so-called covenant 
marriage statutes, which allow couples planning to marry to select between modern mar-
riage (with the option of no-fault divorce) and traditional (covenant) marriage (without that 
option) presume to limit choice through the mechanism of choice. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§§ 901-05 (1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West 2002). See generally Jason Andrew 
Macke, Note, Of Covenants and Conflicts—When “I Do” Means More Than It Used To, But 
Less Than You Thought, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1377 (1998). Such laws suggest that potential 
spouses can successfully select between tradition and modernity and that tradition could 
thereby be revived were enough people to choose tradition over modernity. However, cove-
nant marriage statutes suggest the basic infirmity of the effort to safeguard tradition 
through the elaboration of choice. Once choice defines the enterprise (here the construction 
of family relationships) then, eventually, any particular choice can be displaced by a host of 
other choices.  
 189. LUKER, supra note 90, at 228 (noting that pro-life activists premise their argu-
ments on the deeply held belief that every embryo is a baby). 
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structed a mode of argument that apparently safeguards tradition 
without expressly debunking choice in familial settings. As a result, 
they need not openly dispute the consequences of gender equality for 
family life.190  
 For abortion opponents, perhaps in part due to the greater public 
appeal of arguments about embryonic and fetal personhood as com-
pared with arguments about women’s inexorable status,191 the strug-
gle to have abortion declared illegal and immoral has become a more 
and more intense focus and concern in the last few decades. The 
shifting character of pro-life activist tactics is illustrative.192 In addi-
tion to widespread political193 and legal194 efforts to outlaw abortion, 
                                                                                                                      
 190. Id. (noting that even some pro-life activists have favored the notion of an Equal 
Rights Amendment). 
 191. Even those firmly committed to safeguarding the right to abortion are often reluc-
tant to debate questions about the status of fetuses and embryos. Saxton, supra note 170, 
at 390.  
 192. In the 1980s and 1990s, those who opted to abort pregnancies, as those perform-
ing the abortions and those caring for the patients before and after the procedure, faced 
threats of bombing, arson, and murder from the so-called Army of God. See HULL & HOF-
FER, supra note 125, at 269. In 1998 a sniper named James Charles Kopp murdered Dr. 
Barnett Slepian because Slepian performed abortions. Id. This sort of violence and threats 
of its continuance discouraged doctors from performing abortions in the 1990s and discour-
aged medical schools and physician training programs from teaching medical students and 
doctors how to do so. Id. at 269-70. Other tactics have aimed to embarrass and shame 
women seeking abortions or to shock the public into opposing abortion. For instance, in the 
summer of 2002, the Center for Bioethical Reform, a pro-life group based in California, ar-
ranged for banners depicting aborted fetuses to be flown over public beaches on Long Is-
land. Thai Jones, Anti-Abortion Group Unfurls Air Campaign/Using Plan Banners to Pro-
voke, NEWSDAY, July 11, 2002, at A22. According to Gregg Cunningham, director of the 
Center, the group hoped to devote two million dollars to finance additional demonstrations 
of a similar sort over various summer festivals and sporting activities. Id. 
 193. Beginning in the 1970s, Christian evangelicals and fundamentalists opposing 
abortion joined with political conservatives. Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority sought to elect 
political conservatives and to oppose abortion. ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE 
POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? 82 (1993). In addition to its commitment to 
opposing abortion and working for political conservatives, the Moral Majority pledged itself 
to fight homosexuality and pornography and to work toward reviving prayer in public 
schools. Id. 
 By 1980, the new Christian right, a coalition of religious fundamentalists and political 
conservatives played a significant role in the election of President Ronald Reagan. Id. 
 194. In the years following Roe, abortion opponents succeeded in convincing state legis-
latures to restrict the right to abortion. For instance, a Missouri statute at issue in Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), was amended to proclaim as legis-
lative “findings” that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception.” Id. at 500-01 
(quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986)). The statute provided, among other 
things, that state employees be precluded from performing abortions and that abortions 
not be performed in public facilities when such abortions were not needed to save the 
woman’s life (even if the pregnant woman paid for the abortion). Id. at 501. A number of 
states also passed a variety of spousal and parental consent requirements. But see Bellotti 
v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (plurality opinion) (allowing state to man-
date parental involvement in minor’s abortion decision only if state also provided for judi-
cial bypass option); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69, 74 
(1976) (striking down spousal consent requirement and blanket provisions requiring pa-
rental consent). 
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opponents of abortion have relied on embarrassment,195 shock tac-
tics,196 and violence,197 including murder and threats of murder.198 
Moreover, pro-life adherents have been supported by a variety of le-
gal provisions premised on the personhood of embryonic and fetal 
life.199  
 Thus pro-life adherents are more reluctant than ever to compro-
mise their position with regard to fetal and embryonic status. Their 
rhetoric, their tactics, and their underlying agenda all have come to 
depend increasingly on the notion that abortion constitutes murder 
because fetuses and embryos are people.200 Many people believe that 
this view is centuries old.201 In fact, it developed only in the last half 
of the nineteenth century and became the singular theme of the 
                                                                                                                      
 For the most part, the Court supported a limited right to abortion or moved more hesi-
tantly than pro-life forces would have liked in further limiting the right to abortion. Cases 
involving funding of abortions are an exception to this broad pattern. Beginning in 1977, in 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977), the Court upheld a Connecticut regulation that 
withheld Medicaid benefits for non-therapeutic abortions. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
519, 521 (1977) (upholding St. Louis, Missouri municipal funding restriction); Beal v. Doe, 
432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (upholding Pennsylvania abortion funding restriction). In Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 316-18 (1980), the Court upheld federal legislation limiting 
federal funding for abortions. The legislation precluded Medicaid from paying even for 
medically necessary abortions unless the pregnancy had resulted from rape or incest or the 
life of the mother was at stake. Id. at 302 (quoting Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123 
§ 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1980)). Then in 1989, in Webster, 492 U.S. at 511-13, the Court upheld 
Missouri’s prohibition on state funding for abortions unless the mother’s life was endan-
gered. 
 195. Joseph Scheidler, who helped form Operation Rescue, authored a manual in 1983 
called Closed: Ninety-Nine Ways to Stop Abortion. The manual instructed antiabortion 
groups in confrontational tactics. Among other things, Scheidler suggested that abortion 
opponents intimidate women going into clinics. HULL & HOFFER, supra note 125, at 212.  
 196. See Jones, supra note 192, at A22. In 2002, six states (Alabama, Florida, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Carolina) agreed to sell automobile license plates 
reading “Choose Life.” Jay Krall, Pro-Life License Plates Spark Controversy, WALL ST. J., 
June 12, 2002. In the two years after Florida introduced the plates, it raised one million 
dollars (at twenty dollars surcharge per plate). Id. The money has been slated for funding 
counseling centers that discourage abortion and paying expenses of women with unwanted 
pregnancies who plan to give birth and then surrender the babies for adoption. Id. 
 197. In 1982 an abortion clinic was bombed for the first time in the United States. 
Within two years over twenty additional bombings occurred at abortion clinics. HULL & 
HOFFER, supra note 125, at 210. Within the next few years, hundreds of abortion clinics 
were bombed, burned, threatened, or vandalized. Id. at 210-11. In the early 1980s, a Bene-
dictine novice, Joseph Scheidler, and a Pentecostal minister, Randall Terry, joined to form 
Operation Rescue, an organization engaged in tactics of “massive confrontation.” Id. at 
212-13. 
 198. See id. at 261, 269 (describing murder of Dr. David Gunn and Dr. Barnett Sle-
pian). A number of additional murders followed. Id. 
 199. See, e.g., Webster 492 U.S. at 501 (1989) (upholding provision of Missouri law that 
stated that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception”) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-24 (West 2002) (referring to “in vitro 
fertilized human ovum” as a “juridical person” and as a “biological human being”). 
 200. LUKER, supra note 90, at 228. 
 201. Id. at 14. 
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movement to oppose abortion in the aftermath of Roe.202 It has been 
essential to the survival of the pro-life movement as that movement 
has faced a society and a legal system that have largely conceded 
tradition to modernity (with its promise of apparently unending 
choice) in family settings. In the notion of fetal and embryonic per-
sonhood, the pro-life movement located a focus that elided, while 
harmonizing with, an interest in safeguarding old-fashioned family 
life. 
IV.   LEGAL RESPONSES TO EMBRYOS, CLONING, AND STEM CELLS 
 By the last years of the twentieth century, the right-to-life move-
ment faced two broad challenges—the first essentially social and the 
second essentially scientific. The social challenge, consisting of broad 
demographic and ideological changes in American family life, oc-
curred first.203 The movement adapted to these changes with moder-
ate success in the years following Roe (itself a reflection of the ideo-
logical change).204 It did this by focusing on and elaborating argu-
ments about the sanctity of fetal and embryonic life and by limiting 
engagement in widespread public debate about the scope of family 
life. The scientific challenge developed later—only in the last couple 
of years of the twentieth century. This second challenge threatens to 
undermine the movement’s claims about the sanctity of embryonic 
and fetal life. Therefore, it may emerge as a significant stumbling 
block for the right-to-life movement. In particular, therapeutic clon-
ing and embryonic stem cell research are heralding a new age in 
medicine that promises cures for a wide variety of painful, debilitat-
ing conditions.205  
 Claims about the sanctity of embryonic life, comparatively effec-
tive in the debate about abortion,206 are meeting unfamiliar rejoin-
ders in the context of embryonic research. In a society that views 
health as tantamount to salvation,207 it is difficult to dismiss san-
                                                                                                                      
 202. The nineteenth-century right-to-life movement, spearheaded by physicians en-
gaged in a struggle to upgrade the status of their profession, attributed personhood to em-
bryos and fetuses. Id. at 14-18, 31-32. However, at that time, this claim was connected ex-
pressly to claims about the sanctity of traditional family life within which women were ex-
pected to serve as nurturers to treasured children and husbands (assumed to suffer from 
the tensions of the marketplace), and men were expected to work as breadwinner for the 
family. See HODGE supra note 112, at 32-33 (delineating women’s motives for abortion to 
include “indisposition to have the care, the expense, or the trouble of children, or some 
other motive equally trifling and degrading”) (quoted in LUKER, supra note 90, at 22); 
MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 121, at 50.  
 203. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
 205. Zitner, supra note 85, at A1; see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.  
 206. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
 207. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF MEDICAL 
PERCEPTION 198 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Vintage Books 1975) (1963). 
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guinely research that promises to provide cures for a host of deleteri-
ous, often fatal, or seriously debilitating illnesses and disabilities.208 
This Part summarizes society’s and the law’s changing responses to 
embryos (and, by implication, to fetuses) as the debate about abor-
tion merges with the debate about embryonic stem cell research and 
cloning for the production of research embryos. 
A.   The Law and the “Embryo” in the Decades Immediately  
Following Roe 
 At least since Roe was decided in 1973, those working to overturn 
the Court’s decision, or at least, to limit a woman’s right to abortion 
have premised their arguments on an understanding of the ontologi-
cal status of embryos and fetuses as moral beings.209 In this frame, 
the interests of a pregnant woman to control her body, and her ma-
ternity, are balanced by the interests of the developing fetus. Thus, 
within the politics of abortion, claims about the sanctity of embryonic 
and fetal life oppose claims grounded in a woman’s right to autono-
mous choice.210  
 In sharp contrast, within the context of debate about therapeutic 
cloning and embryonic stem cell research, claims about embryonic 
life are opposed by claims about the value of promised therapies for 
people suffering from an array of illnesses that remain largely incur-
able and unexplained (including Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, 
and multiple sclerosis).211 As a result, legal limits on the right to 
abortion and on funding for research on embryos and fetuses, im-
posed in the last decades of the twentieth century, have been opened 
to intense new debate and to reexamination. This Section first briefly 
summarizes some limits imposed on the right to abortion after Roe. 
Further, it describes the advent of human in vitro fertilization about 
two decades before the appearance of therapeutic cloning and the iso-
lation of embryonic stem cells. The Section then reviews legal re-
                                                                                                                      
 208. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50, at 91. The President’s 
Council on Bioethics, while recommending a moratorium on research cloning (called clon-
ing-for-biomedical-research) asserted:  
American society and human communities in general have an obligation to try to 
heal the sick and relieve their suffering. This obligation, deeply rooted in the 
moral teaching of “love of neighbor,” lies heaviest on physicians and health-care 
professionals who attend to individual patients. But it also guides the activities of 
biomedical scientists and biotechnologists whose pioneering research and discov-
eries provide new and better means of healing and relieving those who suffer. 
Id. at 97-98. 
 209. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
 210. HULL & HOFFER, supra note 125, at 7 (noting that the lawyer for Roe framed her 
arguments around a woman’s right to end a pregnancy while the lawyer for the state 
framed arguments around the rights of the unborn). 
 211. See Auerbach, supra note 3, at 1567 n.2. 
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sponses in the context of debate about embryonic stem cells and clon-
ing for research. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the pro-life movement achieved some suc-
cess in limiting the right to abortion. In particular, some states and 
the federal government passed laws that restricted access to abortion 
services and laws that precluded state funding for abortion.212 Among 
the laws that limited the abortion right were those that restricted a 
minor’s access to abortion without parental notification and/or con-
sent.213 Among the state laws that prevented the state from paying 
for abortions were those that placed limitations on Medicaid coverage 
for abortion.214 The abortion rate dropped dramatically in those 
states that precluded the use of state funds to pay for abortions.215  
 At the same time, the right-to-life movement began to lobby 
against research on fetal tissue; that effort paralleled the  move-
ment’s work to restrict funds for abortions.216 Pro-life adherents 
voiced concern that Roe would result in the abuse of aborted fetuses 
in research settings.217 The call to stop public funding of fetal re-
search was actively supported by abortion opponents, was taken up 
by a group of largely conservative state and federal lawmakers, in-
cluding several presidents,218 and from the start, was openly prem-
ised on conclusions about the morality of abortion.219  
 Research using fetal tissue ex utero had actually begun in the 
1930s.220 However, the research did not become the subject of social 
and legal controversy until after Roe.221 Soon a series of restrictions 
on federal funding for fetal research flowed from a variety of congres-
                                                                                                                      
 212. HULL & HOFFER, supra note 125, at 195. 
 213. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 625, 643 (1979) (plurality opinion) (allow-
ing limitation on minor’s access to abortion). 
 214. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 316-18 (1980) (holding no entitle-
ment to even therapeutic abortions on economic grounds); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466, 
474 (1977) (finding no “unduly burdensome interference” with decision to terminate a preg-
nancy). 
 215. Kate Zernike, 30 Years After Abortion Ruling, New Trends but the Old Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A1. 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 194 (describing Court’s upholding statutes re-
stricting state funding for abortion). 
 217. See John C. Fletcher, The Stem Cell Debate in Historical Context, in THE HUMAN 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 2, at 
27, 27. 
 218. See Ellen J. Flannery & Gail H. Javitt, Analysis of Federal Laws Pertaining to 
Funding of Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research (commissioned paper), in II ETHICAL 
ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH (National Bioethics Advisory Commission 2000) 
[hereinafter NBAC 2000]. 
 219. See LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 131 (2002) (not-
ing “[i]n a society deeply divided over the moral and legal status of embryos, any scientific 
or medical project using tissue or cells from the unborn is bound to raise serious philoso-
phical and social concerns”). 
 220. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 29. 
 221. Id. 
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sional, presidential, and administrative decisions.222 In the 1970s, as 
the federal government began to restrict funding for fetal tissue re-
search,223 some states also passed laws regulating such research.224 A 
few states prohibited all research using fetal tissue.225  
 In 1974, Congress imposed a moratorium on federal funding for 
fetal research.226 Congress provided that the moratorium could be 
lifted pending a report by the newly created National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
                                                                                                                      
 222. Beginning in the mid-1970s, compliance with federal regulations was required of 
all research supported by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW), re-
named the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in 1979. Nicolas P. Terry, 
“Alas! Poor Yorick,” I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimen-
tation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419, 444 (1986). 
Regulations promulgated in 1975 by the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research required that risks to the fetus be mini-
mized. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(2) (1985); Terry, supra, at 444. Under the regulations, re-
search on dead fetuses was generally left to the states. Terry, supra, at 444-45 (citing 45 
C.F.R. § 46.210 (1985)). Research on ex utero fetuses was allowed only in cases where the 
research would not alter the duration of fetal life. Id. at 445 (quoting THE NAT’L COMM’N 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 
33,530 (1975)). Significant limitations were placed on nontherapeutic fetal research. Id. at 
445-46. 
 223. In late 1973, the National Institutes of Health released guidelines regarding fund-
ing for fetal tissue research. Jonathan Hersey, Note, Enigma of the Unborn Mother: Legal 
and Ethical Considerations of Aborted Fetal Ovarian Tissue and Ova Transplantations, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 159, 170 (1995). A number of important legislative responses followed. Id. 
The first provided for an executive order or a federal statute to preclude federal agencies 
from carrying out research on fetal tissue or to prevent federal funding of private facilities 
carrying out such research. Id. The regulation defined fetal tissue as an abortus. Id. (citing 
38 Fed. Reg. 31,738 (1973)). That term was defined as a “fetus . . . expelled whole, whether 
spontaneously or as a result of medical or surgical intervention to terminate a pregnancy, 
prior to viability.” Id. at 170 (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 31,747 § 46.31 (1973)). A second legisla-
tive response relegated decisions about fetal tissue research to any applicable state and lo-
cal law. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1994). Further, in 1974, Congress appointed the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
Fletcher, supra note 217, at 27. The National Commission was authorized by the National 
Research Act of 1974. Hersey, supra, at 170. The Commission promulgated a series of 
rules, passed by Congress in 1975, that applied to research funded by the Department of 
Health and Human Services. Id. at 171 (restricting guidelines reach to federal agencies 
and federally funded researchers).  
 224. Terry, supra note 222, at 446-47. Some state laws required consent for experi-
ments with fetal tissue. Id. Other states limited research on aborted fetuses or limited 
payment to research that might encourage abortion. Id. Other states allowed research on 
dead fetuses only under certain circumstances. Id. at 448. 
 225. Id. at 448. But see Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(citation omitted) (finding unconstitutional a provision in Illinois abortion law prohibiting 
experimentation on a fertilized human egg “unless such experimentation is therapeutic to 
the fetus thereby produced”). The law at issue in Hartigan concerns embryos, and thus was 
among a small number of state laws that spoke to research involving embryos. Terry, su-
pra note 222, at 462-63. 
 226. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 342, 348 
(1974). The rule was to be effective until the DHHS received a report by the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
Id. The DHHS response followed delivery of that report.  
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search.227 The Commission’s report, submitted in 1975, became the 
basis for regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (DHEW) about research involving pregnant women, fe-
tuses, and human in vitro fertilization.228 These regulations, codified 
at 45 C.F.R. § 46,229 have been adopted by most federal agencies and 
are at the center of the present debate about federal funding for em-
bryonic research.230 The regulations permitted research on nonliving 
fetuses, but subjected such research to applicable state laws.231 
 The regulations further required that no research involving in vi-
tro fertilization (IVF) could receive federal funding before an Ethical 
Advisory Board (EAB), appointed by DHEW, approved the re-
search.232 In 1978, after the first birth of a baby conceived through 
IVF, Joseph Califano, then Secretary of DHEW, asked the EAB to 
review the legal and ethical implications of human IVF.233 The result-
ing report found such research ethically acceptable as long as several 
conditions were met by researchers.234 Califano never acted on the 
EAB Report,235 and DHEW dissolved the Advisory Board in 1980.236  
 By then, Ronald Reagan had been elected to office with the assis-
tance of abortion opponents.237 Reagan immediately sought to pre-
clude federal funding for research on fetal tissue. He announced that 
because research on fetuses would promote abortion, using taxpayer 
                                                                                                                      
 227. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 29-30. 
 228. See id.; NBAC 2000, supra note 218, at D-3 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,530 
(Aug. 8, 1975) (establishing Subpart B of 45 C.F.R. § 46).  
 229. Creation of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bio-
medical and Behavioral Research followed revelation of a number of scandals including the 
Tuskegee syphilis study. Anne Wood et al., The Crisis in Human Participants Research: 
Identifying the Problems and Proposing Solutions, The President’s Council on Bioethics, at 
http://www.bioethics.gov/background/emanuelpaper. html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003). The 
Commission’s proposal (known as the Common Rule) is codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2003). 
Id. 
 230. See NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 30, 38 n.5. 
 231. NBAC 2000, supra note 218, at D-4. 
 232. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 34 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d), repealed by 
National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, § 121 (c)). 
 233. Id. at 34. 
 234. ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: DHEW SUPPORT OF 
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (May 1979). 
The Board’s report proposed conditioning such research on informed consent, use of em-
bryos no more than fourteen days after fertilization, and an interest in serving a research 
goal “not reasonably attainable by other means.” Id. at 106-07. The EAB Report provided 
for informed consent and advised that research occur before the fourteenth day after fer-
tilization. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 34. 
 235. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 34. 
 236. Id. 
 237. HULL & HOFFER, supra note 125, at 207. Reagan, who had favored a right to abor-
tion when he served as Governor of California, became a vociferous opponent by the time 
he ran for president. Hull and Hoffer report that in the 1980 election, Reagan transmitted 
personal messages to pro-life adherents, such as the National Right to Life Committee and 
Jerry Falwell, informing them that he supported their cause. Id.  
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funds to support such research would implicate the public in fetal 
deaths.238 Accordingly, Reagan banned the use of federal funds for re-
search involving fetal tissue.239 The ban was preserved during the 
administration of the first President Bush.240 Louis Sullivan, Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS, pre-
viously DHEW) during the Bush administration, explained that pro-
viding for research on fetal tissue would encourage elective abor-
tions.241 
 After the EAB was disbanded in 1980, the Department did not 
appoint a second board. In consequence, no research involving hu-
man embryos was funded pursuant to the 1979 EAB report to Secre-
tary Califano.242 Nothing changed until 1993, when Congress passed 
the Revitalization Act.243 Under the Act, EAB approval was elimi-
nated as a prerequisite for IVF research.244 As a result, Harold Var-
mus, Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), set up a 
Human Embryo Research Panel to review “areas of research involv-
ing the ex utero human embryo” and to consider which areas were 
appropriate for federal funding.245 Among other things, the Panel 
concluded that research involving embryonic stem cells was ethical 
and could be funded as long as the donating couple had consented to 
the research.246 No such funding was provided, however, because in 
1995 (and in subsequent years) Congress attached a rider to its 
                                                                                                                      
 238. Nelle S. Paegel, Note, Use of Stem Cells in Biotechnological Research, 22 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1183, 1199 (2001) (citing Alexander Morgan Capron, At Law: Good In-
tentions, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 26 (Mar. 1, 1999)). 
 239. Carly Goldstein, Note, Dipping Into Uncle Sam’s Pockets: Federal Funding of 
Stem Cell Research: Is it Legal?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 229, 237 (2002).  
 240. Id. (citing Lionel Van Deerlin, Politicians Give Way to the Researchers, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIB., Feb. 7, 2001, at B7). President Bush vetoed congressional efforts to provide 
for such funding. Other proposed statues providing for funding were not passed. See H.R. 
2507, 102d Cong. (1991) (amending Part G of Title IV of the Public Health Service Act); 
H.R. 5495, 102d Cong. (1992) (amending Part G of Title IV of the Public Health Service 
Act). 
 The funding moratorium was lifted in 1993 during the administration of President Clin-
ton. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 31. However, in the same year, Congress promulgated 
legislation that regulated research on fetal tissues for transplantation. Id.; National Insti-
tutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1(b)(2) to g-2(b) (1994). 
 241. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 31 (citing letter from Louis Sullivan to William 
Raub (Nov. 2, 1999)). Louis Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services during the 
Bush administration, declared an indefinite moratorium on funding fetal tissue transplan-
tation research. Id. 
 242. Id. at 34. 
 243. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 
Stat. 122 (1993). 
 244. Auerbach, supra note 3, at 1575 (citing NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 43 n.55). 
 245. Id. (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 45,293).  
 246. Id. at 1576 (citing NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 34). 
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DHHS appropriations bill247 that prohibited federal funding of re-
search involving embryos.248 
B.   The Law and the “Embryo” in the Age of Cloning 
 Debate about embryos has grown much more intense and has 
gained widespread public attention in the last several years as soci-
ety has considered the implications of promising new forms of 
healthcare that depend on research with, and therapeutic uses of, 
embryonic stem cells.249 In this new context, lines of ideological de-
bate are merging, the embryo-as-symbols is gaining new meanings, 
old alliances are breaking apart, and new ones are forming. 
 The political struggle to ban therapeutic cloning and embryonic 
stem cell research has been actively supported by pro-life advocates 
whose central arguments were constructed in the politics of abortion. 
The challenge is formidable because concessions about embryonic 
status in the context of research threaten to undermine pro-life ar-
guments regarding abortion.250 In opposing embryonic research, and 
thus therapeutic cloning, pro-life advocates have been joined by an 
unexpected combination of feminists, concerned with a view of 
women as “egg bearers,”251 and intellectual neo-conservatives in 
whose view cloning is a risky, untoward defiance of nature.252 Famil-
                                                                                                                      
 247. The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, tit. I, § 128, 110 
Stat. 26, 34 (1996). The rider has been introduced as an addition to the 2003 appropria-
tions bill. H.R. 246, 108th Cong. (lst Sess. 2003). 
 248. NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 35. The amendment defined a human embryo as 
“any organism . . . derived by fertilization.” Id. at 42 n.59. 
 249. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
 250. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, for instance, has a Pro-Life Ac-
tivities website that argues in a large set of information sheets about cloning, that cloning 
for any purpose creates “an early human embryo,” United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, Fact Sheet: What is Human Cloning?, at http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/ 
biethic/clonfact202.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2003), that the term therapeutic cloning is a 
“euphemism for experimental cloning in which embryos are created to be destroyed,” id., 
and that “[c]loning is the ultimate dehumanizing of human reproduction,” United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Fact Sheet: Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, at 
http://www.nccbuscc.org/prolife/issues/bioethic/clonfact1201.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 
2003) [hereinafter Fact Sheet on 2003 Prohibition Act]. 
 As Congress began to consider legislation regulating human cloning, President George 
W. Bush, the Catholic Church, and a variety of active lobbyists from the antiabortion 
movement, among others, strongly supported Congress’s imposition of a complete ban on 
human cloning. Aaron Zitner, Cloning Receives a Makeover, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at 
A1. 
 251. R. Alta Charo & Laurie Zoloth, Commentary; Stem Cell Research: Issue for 
Women, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at B11. 
 252. Id. Charles Krauthammer, who served on President George W. Bush’s Council on 
Bioethics, opposed reproductive cloning on the ground that cloning threatens “dehumani-
zation of human life.” Ponnuru, supra note 88. Krauthammer is one among a number of 
neo-conservative intellectuals who have opposed research cloning or have sought strictly to 
monitor or postpone its actualization but whose positions are not predicated on religious 
beliefs or on a pro-life position regarding abortion. Others in this group include Leon Kass, 
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iar political positions are further scrambled in that some pro-life ad-
herents support cloning undertaken to produce embryos for research 
and therapy.253 And others who would provide for at least some re-
search on embryos produced through IVF disfavor cloning for re-
search and therapy.254 Thus, as the social and legal debate about em-
bryos extends into the context of therapeutic cloning and stem cell 
research, lines of ideological affiliation shift. As this new debate 
about embryonic status merges with that constructed in reference to 
abortion, the term embryo is being redefined. 
 New interpretations of embryonic status emerge in the evolving 
discourse about embryonic stem cell research and cloning.255 
Interpretations formulated in this context then inform understand-
ings of the embryo in the context of the debate about abortion. When 
decisions about scientific research are rendered openly ideological 
and families are redefined through metaphors constructed within the 
universe of science and health care, the result is ambiguity and con-
fusion. 
 The next Section examines two sets of legal responses to embry-
onic stem cell research and cloning for the production of embryos. 
The first is a form of regulation developed in the 1970s with regard 
to research on fetal tissue. This approach sets limits on federal fund-
ing for fetal and embryonic research. The second approach involves 
banning or restricting cloning as a source of embryonic stem cells. 
1.   Funding for Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
 The complicated weave of legal responses to embryonic research is 
reflected in George W. Bush’s August 2001 decision to provide federal 
funding for limited embryonic stem cell research.256 Bush was elected 
less than a year earlier as a pro-life candidate, yet he provided for 
the use of federal funds to do research on embryonic stem cell lines 
that existed in August 2001. Some background is helpful in inter-
preting Bush’s decision. Beginning in 1995, Congress had relied on 
riders to annual appropriations bills to block federal funding for re-
search that would result in the destruction of embryos.257 However, 
                                                                                                                      
who chaired President Bush’s Council on Bioethics, Francis Fukuyama, who served on the 
Council, and William Kristol. Arthur L. Caplan, Attack of the Anti-Cloners: Morality and 
Human Cloning, THE NATION, June 17, 2002, at 5. 
 253. See infra notes 308-16 and accompanying text. 
 254. Politics and Policy, Human Cloning: House OKs Ban, Rejects Research Amend-
ment, AM. HEALTH L., Aug. 1, 2001 [hereinafter House OKs Ban]. 
 255. Charo & Zoloth, supra note 251. 
 256. See infra notes 265-76 and accompanying text; Teresa R. Wagner, Stem Cell 
Storm, 17 WORLD AND I 62 (2002). 
 257. See NBAC 1999, supra note 62, at 42 n.59 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-99, tit. I, § 128, 
110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996)) (noting as well that a similar rider was attached to congressional 
appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services in subsequent years). 
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the General Counsel to the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Harriet S. Rabb, authored a memorandum in 1999 concluding 
that these congressional riders did not preclude federal funding for 
research using human pluripotent stem cells because “such cells are 
not a human embryo within the statutory definition.”258  
 Rabb’s position was controversial and angered pro-life groups.259 
Many in both the House and the Senate voiced opposition to Rabb’s 
memorandum.260 Nevertheless, NIH Director Harold Varmus re-
solved to prepare agency guidelines for funding embryonic stem cell 
research.261 The guidelines, issued in August 2000,262 provided that 
NIH funds could not be used to derive stem cells from embryos but 
                                                                                                                      
 258. Memorandum from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel, Department of Health and 
Human Services, to Harold Varmus, M.D., Director, National Institutes of Health on Fed-
eral Funding for Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells (Jan. 15, 1999) [here-
inafter Rabb Memorandum], reprinted in ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 219, at 138. The 
Rabb Memorandum interpreted language in the congressional appropriations rider that 
precluded the use of federal funds for: 
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or; 
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded or 
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for re-
search on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b) of the 
Public Health Service Act. 
Id. (quoting Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-227, § 511 (1999)). Embryo was defined in the statute as “any organism, not 
protected as a human subject matter under 45 CFR 46 . . . that is derived by fertilization, 
parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human 
diploid cells.” Id. (emphasis added). Rabb based her conclusion that pluripotent stem cells 
are not human embryos on the determination that pluripotent stem cells are not a human 
organism and thus do not fit within the statute’s definition of human embryos. Id. Rabb 
further explained that a human embryo, as that term is virtually universally understood, 
has the potential to develop in the normal course of events into a living human being. Id. 
Rabb offers the definition of embryo found in the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and 
Technical terms. According to that definition an embryo is “[t]he product of conception up 
to the third month of human pregnancy.” Pluripotent stem cells, however, do not have the 
capacity to develop into a human being, even if transferred to a uterus. Rabb Memoran-
dum, supra. 
 Rabb further considered the legal limits on the use of human fetal tissue. In this regard, 
she noted that stem cells derived from primordial germ cells fit into the definition of hu-
man fetal tissue under Section 498A of the Public Health Service Act. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1(g) 
(1994); Rabb Memorandum, supra. The Act places certain limits on the use of such tissue 
including prohibition of its sale, restrictions on its use in fetal tissue transplantation re-
search if the research is supported by federal funds, and prohibition on the transplantation 
of such tissue to specific individuals. Rabb Memorandum, supra. 
 259. Wagner, supra note 256. 
 260. Id. More than sixty representatives and nine senators wrote to then Secretary of 
DHHS, Donna Shalala, opposing Rabb’s analysis. Id. 
 261. Sharon M. Parker, Critique, Bringing the “Gospel of Life” to American Jurispru-
dence: A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Critique of Federal Funding for Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 771, 778 (2001) (citing letter from 
Christopher Smith, Congressman, to Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (Feb. 11, 1999)) (on file with author)). 
 262. Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 
51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000). 
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could be used to study embryonic stem cells derived without federal 
support.263  
 When George W. Bush came to office in January 2001, pro-lifers 
expected him to move quickly to prohibit federal funding of stem cell 
research.264 Yet, Bush did not respond immediately to the debate 
about embryonic research. Rather, he announced that he would re-
view the issues. In the meantime, he appointed Tommy Thompson to 
head DHHS. Thompson had long opposed abortion but, as Governor 
of Wisconsin, had publicly supported stem cell research at the state 
university.265 
 In August 2001, Bush announced a compromise that allowed lim-
ited federal funding for embryonic research. His announcement re-
ferred expressly to the concerns of those opposed to abortion and of 
those not necessarily opposed to abortion but anxious to safeguard 
the sanctity of life (which they saw as threatened on other grounds 
by embryonic stem cell research).266 Bush provided for the use of fed-
eral funds for research on sixty stem cell lines that existed on the 
date of his remarks.267 With regard to these cell lines, he explained, a 
                                                                                                                      
 263. Id. at 51,979. In response to the guidelines issuance, a group of plaintiffs, repre-
sented by the public interest law firm of the Christian Legal Society, sued NIH. Nightlight 
Christian Adoptions v. Thompson, No. 01-CV-502 (D.D.C. as of Jan. 18, 2002). Plaintiffs 
asserted that DHHS’s issuance of the guidelines “violate[d] the federal law prohibiting the 
use of DHHS appropriations to fund research in which human embryos are knowingly de-
stroyed or discarded or are unnecessarily subjected to more than minimal risk.” Id.; 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, § 510 (Dec. 21, 2000) (citing Pub. L. No. 
106-554); Nightlight Christian Adoptions v. Thompson, Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief (D.D.C. filed Mar. 8, 2001). 
 264. Arthur Allen, Politics Feature: Will Thompson, Bush Clash Over Human Embryo 
Research?, Salon.com (Dec. 29, 2000), at http://dir.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/12/29/  
embryo/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003). Bush’s spokesman, Scott McClellan, as-
serted in December 2000, shortly before Bush’s inauguration, that Bush had “consistently 
opposed federal funding for research that requires embryos to be discarded or destroyed.” 
Id. 
 The issue of embryonic stem cell research was rarely considered during the 2000 cam-
paign. Rick Weiss, Biomedical Research Goes Where Candidates Dare Not, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 29, 2000, at A23. On one occasion, however, in August 2000, soon after the promulga-
tion of NIH guidelines that provided for funding of such research, the Democratic candi-
date, Albert Gore, supported the new rules while George Bush opposed them. Id.; see also 
Mark Kukis, Bush White House Would End Stem Cell Research, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Sept. 
22, 2000 (noting that if elected, he would end federal funding for stem cell research). 
 265. Allen, supra note 264. In July 2002, Tommy Thompson noted that the NIH had 
begun to issue grants for embryonic research. Thompson explained: “[W]e’re already be-
ginning to realize the promise of this kind of research . . . . I am passionate about moving 
forward with this kind of research [on adult and embryonic stem cells] within the guide-
lines established by President Bush. Tommy G. Thompson, Global Promise, DAILY DEAL, 
July 16, 2002.  
 266. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President’s Embry-
onic Stem Cell Research Policy (Aug. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Bush Remarks], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html (last visited Aug. 23, 
2003), reprinted in ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 219, at 141.  
 267. Id. In July 2002, Tommy Thompson reported that DHHS had distributed embry-
onic stem cell lines to laboratories for research. Thompson, supra note 265. 
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“life and death decision has already been made.”268 He precluded fed-
eral support for work on stem cell lines not yet developed.269  
 Bush’s justification for his compromise position suggests the 
framework within which public debate about embryonic stem cells is 
being constructed. Bush invoked two essential interests. First, ex-
plaining that his conclusions were “shaped by deeply held beliefs,” he 
described one set of concerns: 
I’m a strong supporter of science and technology, and believe they 
have the potential for incredible good—to improve lives, to save 
life, to conquer disease. Research offers hope that millions of our 
loved ones may be cured of a disease and rid of their suffering. I 
have friends whose children suffer from juvenile diabetes. Nancy 
Reagan has written me about President Reagan’s struggle with 
Alzheimer’s. My own family has confronted the tragedy of child-
hood leukemia. And, like all Americans, I have great hope for 
cures.270 
This part of Bush’s statement reflects two themes embedded in the 
American health care system and in public responses to that system. 
The first is the notion that health care promises salvation.271 Second, 
the comments suggest the individualization of health care. Bush fo-
cused on individuals whose lives and welfare, or whose family mem-
bers’ lives and welfare, appeared to depend on the success of stem 
cell research.272  
 Then Bush outlined a second, contrasting set of convictions: 
                                                                                                                      
 268. Bush Remarks, supra note 266. 
 269. Id. In May 2002, the NIH awarded federal funds for stem cell research on fetuses 
to John Gearhart and other researchers at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. 
Jeremy Manier, U.S. Quietly OKs Fetal Stem Cell Work; Bush Allows Funding Despite 
Federal Limits on Embryo Use, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2002, at 1. The rules for research on fe-
tal, as opposed to embryonic, tissue were promulgated during the administration of Presi-
dent Clinton. However, the grant to Gearhart’s laboratory is the first use of federal funds 
for fetal stem cell research. Id. 
 Gearhart, who isolated germ cells from fetal gonads in 1998, proposed working with fe-
tuses, not embryos. However, the administration’s approval of the grant represents the 
first use of federal funds to study stem cells isolated from fetal tissue. Id. In April 2002, 
DHHS announced that it planned to award grants worth a total of $3.5 million to four in-
stitutions to assist in distributing existing human embryonic stem cells. Antonio Regalado, 
U.S. Awards Grants to Extend Rolls of Stem-cell Researchers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2002, 
at B6. The grants went to BresaGen Ltd. in Australia; ES Cell International Pte. in Singa-
pore; the University of California, San Francisco; and the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation (affiliated with the University of Wisconsin). Id. In July 2002, Tommy Thomp-
son, Secretary of DHHS, announced that fourteen laboratories had been given authoriza-
tion to do research using government funds with the embryonic cell lines that existed on 
August 11, 2001 (the date of President Bush’s remarks). Thompson, supra note 265. “We 
have,” declared Thompson, “begun issuing grants to companies and academic institutions 
to study the stem-cell lines we have approved.” Id. 
 270. Bush Remarks, supra note 266.  
 271. FOUCAULT, supra note 207, at 198. 
 272. Bush Remarks, supra note 266. See infra note 279 and accompanying text (noting 
genomic medicine as metaphor for individualization of health care). 
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I also believe human life is a sacred gift from our Creator. I worry 
about a culture that devalues life, and believe as your President I 
have an important obligation to foster and encourage respect for 
life in America and throughout the world. And while we’re all 
hopeful about the potential of this research, no one can be certain 
that the science will live up to the hope it has generated.273  
Here President Bush, sounding more like the old pro-life candidate 
Bush, focused on the ontological status of the embryo. Then, as if 
presuming to expand on the significance of valuing life, he qualified 
his initial valuation of stem cell research by observing that the 
therapeutic developments to which he had referred were still not ac-
tualized and might never be actualized. Here, in noting that “no one 
can be certain that the science will live up to the hope it has gener-
ated,” Bush seemed to suggest that were the hope actualized the bal-
ance between allowing embryonic research and safeguarding embry-
onic life would shift clearly to favor research.274 
 Bush’s rhetorical balancing of concern for science and concern for 
embryonic life, surprising from a President publically committed to 
opposing abortion,275 represents a turn in the debate about the onto-
logical status of the embryo and thus implicates the central assertion 
on which the pro-life position about abortion has been grounded for 
several decades. In particular, Bush’s implicit suggestion that em-
bryonic research might become more appealing if early research re-
sults bear out current promises undermines the notion of embryo-as-
person. Even more, Bush’s compromise on funding embryonic re-
search reflects a new diversity of viewpoints among pro-life adher-
ents with regard to the status of the embryo.276 
 As a concrete response to the ideological pressures shaping the 
debate about embryonic stem cell research, Bush’s compromise satis-
fied almost no one,277 but it did preclude an immediate escalation of 
                                                                                                                      
 273. Bush Remarks, supra note 266. 
 274. Id.  
 275. During the 2000 campaign Bush told the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (in 
response to a questionnaire they transmitted to him): “I oppose using federal funds to per-
form fetal tissue research from induced abortions.” Manier, supra note 269. 
 276. Wagner, supra note 256. 
 277. Professor Kevin P. Quinn, S.J., J.D, concluded, just before Bush issued his August 
2001 remarks, that a solution permitting research on stem cell lines already derived 
through use of private funds would  
render the serious moral considerations attributed to early human embryos—a 
view taken by several important official bodies—morally meaningless. Embryos 
will be treated merely as replenishable resources and, in this context, talk of “re-
spect” invoked to constrain research is deeply misleading. . . . One clear starting 
point in the debate about the ethics and policy of stem cell research is the moral 
status of the early human embryo. 
Kevin P. Quinn, Embryonic Stem Cell Research as an Ethical Issue: On the Emptiness of 
Symbolic Value, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 851, 854 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
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activist tactics and rhetoric from both advocates and opponents of 
embryonic stem cell research. In the end, Bush’s remarks may prove 
more important as an indication of the parameters of the debate than 
as a scheme for regulating federal funding of embryonic stem cell re-
search.  
 In the context of embryonic research, claims about the sanctity of 
embryonic and fetal life are not opposed—as they are, though often 
implicitly, in the debate about abortion—by claims about equality 
and the need to safeguard autonomous choice. Rather, autonomous 
choice is assumed and claims about embryonic personhood are coun-
tered by claims about cures for sick children, dying adults, and peo-
ple suffering from an array of serious, debilitating conditions. Such 
claims are compelling in a society committed to the notion that 
health brings salvation.278 The mode of cure suggested by embryonic 
stem cell therapy—a uniquely individual form of therapy—provides 
a metaphor for a society increasingly committed to autonomous indi-
viduality.279 That Bush should countenance the use of embryos, even 
pre-existing embryos in research and that he should prize, almost by 
accident it would seem, the individualization of health care, even to 
the very limited extent described in his August 2001 statement, is 
startling. 
 Previously, the Bush administration had consistently sided with 
pro-life interests.280 Soon after his election, for instance, Bush an-
nounced that he would preclude the distribution of federal funds to 
international family-planning organizations that provided for forced 
abortion.281 In 2002, the administration extended government health 
                                                                                                                      
 When Bush’s decision was announced, it was not heralded by the pro-life movement. 
Many pro-lifers saw the President’s compromise as a step back because it provided gov-
ernmental support to research involving embryonic destruction. Wagner, supra note 256. 
Some expressly characterized Bush’s decision as “morally unacceptable.” Id. (quoting the 
response of Bishop Joseph Firenze, President of the United States Conference of Bishops, 
to Bush’s August 9, 2001 statement on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research). 
However, others focused on the President’s preclusion of further embryonic destruction in 
federally funded work. Those favoring embryonic stem cell research hoped that Bush 
would extend the availability of federal funds to support work on embryonic stem cell lines 
not yet derived. Id. Some expressed gratitude that the President had not foreclosed federal 
funding for the research. Id. 
 278. FOUCAULT, supra note 207. 
 279. See, e.g., Charo & Zoloth, supra note 251 (opinion piece supporting embryonic 
stem cell research and therapeutic cloning from feminist perspective and noting potential 
of the research to provide individualized cures). 
 280. Often, support of the Bush administration for the pro-life positions has occurred, 
as Gary Bauer, a conservative activist, has described it, “under the radar.” Karen Tumulty 
& Viveca Novak, Under the Radar, TIME, Jan. 27, 2003, at 38; Adam Clymer, U.S. Revises 
Sex Information, and a Fight Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2002, at A17. 
 281. Tumulty & Novak, supra note 280; Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Blocks Money for Fam-
ily Clinics Promoted by U.N., N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A1 (Bush administration an-
nounces it will not contribute to United Nations Population Fund because the Fund is said 
to help agencies in the Chinese government that force women to terminate pregnancies). 
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benefits to unborn children.282 Also in 2002, information was removed 
or altered on some of the federal government’s medical websites, in-
cluding those of the National Cancer Institute and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.283 All these changes reflect the ad-
ministration’s broad support for a pro-life agenda.284 
2.   Legal Responses to Therapeutic\Research Cloning 
 That support is reflected in the administration’s position on 
therapeutic cloning. Bush has steadfastly refused to countenance the 
production of embryos for stem cell research. In practice, therapeutic 
cloning is distinct from reproductive cloning.285 However, the two are 
often presented in legislative deliberations and popular appeals as 
indistinguishable.286 And so, for the Bush administration, the notion 
of providing for any sort of cloning using human cells is anathema.287 
In part, that conflation in discourse of therapeutic and reproductive 
cloning reflects an essentially theological position that presumes the 
personhood of embryos.288 In part, it reflects the powerful symbolism 
still evoked by use of the term cloning. Even for scientists, cloning is 
multivalent, sometimes even suggesting a social world gone awry.289  
 The suggestion that therapeutic cloning is no different than re-
productive cloning, or that it will inevitably lead to reproductive clon-
ing, has been compelling to many who might otherwise have been 
                                                                                                                      
 282. Amy Goldstein, Bush to Extend Health Care Benefits to Fetuses; New Rule Stirs 
Abortion Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at A4. The change, the result of an amend-
ment to a DHHS regulation, affects the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, which 
had covered health care for children from birth to age nineteen. Id. 
 283. Clymer, supra note 280. 
 284. For instance, information was deleted on the National Cancer Institute’s website 
that reported the absence of a connection between breast cancer and abortion. Id. Soledad 
O’Brien, Representative Tom Allen and Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health and 
Human Services Patrick Fagan Speak About Changes on Some Government-run Medical 
Web Sites, NBC News Transcripts, Dec. 28, 2002 (available in LEXIS). 
 285. The laboratory techniques used to clone somatic cells are the same regardless of 
the use to which the resulting embryonic cells will be put. Ron Seely, Abortion Debate 
Shifts; Stem Cells Could Become a Factor Before the Supreme Court; Roe v. Wade 30th An-
niversary, WIS. ST. J., Jan. 19, 2003, at A1. Embryonic stem cells only exist during the ear-
liest part of embryonic development. Editor’s Choice, Cell Biology: MIT Research Helps 
Find Elusive Adult Stem Cells, STEM CELL WK., Jan. 20, 2003, at 1. 
 286. Therapeutic (or research) cloning results in embryos for use in research. Repro-
ductive cloning would result in a cloned baby. Coby S. Nixon, Note, Human Cloning and 
the Commerce Power: In Light of United States v. Lopez, Congress Can—But Should Not—
Regulate Human Cloning, 37 GA. L. REV. 295, 297 (2002). 
 287. See Rick Weiss, New Status for Embryos in Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2002, 
at A1 (noting the Bush administration’s altering of the charter of the federal advisory 
committee concerned with safety of research volunteers to include embryos as human sub-
jects). 
 288. See Nixon, supra note 286, at 297. 
 289. Kotler, supra note 39 (quoting Irv Weissman, a Stanford biology professor, who 
claimed that “[c]loning has as many meanings to a scientist as ice to an Eskimo or love to 
Oprah Winfrey”). 
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willing to support therapeutic cloning. Scientists, anxious to proceed 
with therapeutic cloning have pleaded that therapeutic cloning be 
given a new name to differentiate it from cloning for the creation of a 
person.290 In any event, the association between therapeutic and re-
productive cloning has discouraged support for therapeutic cloning.291 
Further, the use of therapeutic cloning to produce embryos for re-
search has implicated stem cell research in the debate about thera-
peutic cloning.292  
 Pro-life adherents have worked actively to oppose therapeutic 
cloning. They seek legal prohibitions on embryonic research by link-
ing that research to a slew of horrors suggested by cloning. They ar-
gue that therapeutic cloning entails the creation and destruction of 
living humans, and even worse, that therapeutic cloning is only the 
top of a slippery slope that leads to reproductive cloning.293 Such ar-
guments have proved compelling to many. In 2001, the House of Rep-
resentatives passed a bill that would have criminalized all forms of 
cloning.294 The President lauded the bill,295 which passed by a vote of 
                                                                                                                      
 290. Weinberg, supra note 14, at 57 (referring to an article published in Science in 
early 2000 in which three scientists asked that therapeutic cloning be called “nuclear 
transplantation” or “stem cell research”). 
 Others have connected therapeutic cloning to the abuses of eugenics in earlier decades. 
Id. at 59 (quoting Jeremy Rifkin who asserted that “[t]he problem with therapeutic cloning 
is that it introduces commercial eugenics from the get-go”). 
 291. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL CLONING INQUIRY, supra note 50, at 27 (criticizing use of 
term “therapeutic cloning” on the grounds that the only distincition between research and 
reproductive cloning “is based entirely on the differing goals of the cloners”); Lesko & 
Buckley, supra note 69 (noting that “reproductive cloning” is the “most controversial” type 
of cloning).  
 292. Kotler, supra note 39. 
 293. See, e.g., Fact Sheet on 2003 Prohibition Act, supra note 250. The fact sheet ex-
plains that “[c]loning is the ultimate dehumanizing of human reproduction.” Id. It then de-
nies the validity of a distinction between research and reproductive cloning: 
Such a ban [on reproductive cloning only] does not actually ban cloning. It waits 
until the cloning procedure is finished, then forbids live birth of the resulting 
clones. It would be highly ineffective even at achieving its own goal—once cloned 
embryos are readily available in the laboratory, transfer to wombs is easily done; 
any effort to enforce the law once this occurs would require forced abortions, vio-
lating sound moral principles as well as the Constitution. 
Id. 
 294. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302 (2001). The 
bill was introduced by Representative Dave Weldon (R.-Fla.). The bill also would have 
banned the importation of cloned products for research. Id.  
 The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 
2001 noted: 
H.R. 2505, the “Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001,” amends Title 18, 
United States Code, by establishing a comprehensive ban on human cloning and 
prohibiting the importation of a cloned embryo, or any product derived from such 
embryo. Any person or entity that is convicted of violating this prohibition is sub-
ject to a fine or imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or both. In addition, 
H.R. 2505 provides a civil penalty of not less than $1,000,000 for any person who 
receives a monetary gain from cloning humans. However, H.R. 2505 does not pro-
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265-162.296 But by the summer of 2002, when the Senate entertained 
a similar bill, sentiment against prohibiting all forms of cloning had 
cooled in the face of the strong consortium of lobbyists that included 
patient advocates, scientists, and representatives of the biotechnol-
ogy industry. The Senate bill297 was not passed by the 107th  Con-
gress, but a similar bill has been reintroduced in the 108th 
Congress.298 In early 2003, the House once again passed a bill that 
would criminalize all forms of cloning using human cells and that 
would make it illegal for patients to import medical therapy depend-
ent on embryonic stem cells.299 
 Supporters of the House bill in the 107th Congress expressly con-
nected the need to prohibit all human cloning with the abortion de-
bate, in general, and with sanctity of embryonic life, in particular. 
Representative Henry Hyde (R.-Ill.), for instance, declared that “[a]n 
embryo is a human life. It is not a speck of dust. Is it appropriate to 
create human life in a petri dish and then destroy that life to get at a 
cell? I say no.”300 But even in the House, where The Human Cloning 
                                                                                                                      
hibit the use of cloning technology to produce molecules, DNA, cells, tissues, or-
gans, plants, or animals. 
Report 107-170 (to accompany H.R. 2505), Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (lst 
Sess. 2001). Human reproductive cloning is banned in about two dozen countries including 
France, the United Kingdom, India, Japan, and Brazil. See Daniel J. Kevles, Cloning Can’t 
Be Stopped: Human Clones Are Fodder for Horror Films and Heated Debate, 5 TECH. REV. 
40 (2002). A number of states, including California, Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, 
and Virginia have statutes that prohibit human cloning. Maria S. Quintero, Cloning Cali-
fornians?: Report of the California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning and Recent 
Cloning Related Legislation, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 417, 423 
(2002). These state statutes all provide exceptions for scientific research. Id. In addition, 
Missouri limits state funding of human cloning research. Id. 
 295. Marcia Coyle, Cloning Laws Challenges Research Clones Another Quagmire?, 
NAT’L L.J., May 13, 2002, at A1 (reporting that President Bush supported a complete ban 
on reproductive and on research cloning of human embryos).  
 296. See Kim Coghill, House Goes Even Further in Attempt to Ban All Cloning, BIO-
WORLD TODAY, Mar. 2, 2003, at 14. 
 297. S. 1899, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 298. S. 245, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill, introduced by Senator Brownback is cospon-
sored by one Democratic and twenty-one Republican Senators. 2003 Bill Tracking S. 245. 
The bill was designed to avoid being entertained by the Senate Judiciary Committee be-
cause its Chair, Senator Orrin Hatch, supports therapeutic cloning. Emily Pierce, Leaders 
Circumvent Hatch; Brownback Writes Bill to Avoid Judiciary, ROLL CALL, Feb. 5, 2003. In-
stead, Brownback’s bill is being entertained by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions Committee, chaired by Senator Judd Gregg. Id. 
 299. H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill would ban all cloning using human cells 
and would make it illegal to import a cloned embryo or any product that came from one. 
Mary Agnes Carey, Cloning Debate Undiminished Despite House-Passed Ban, CQ WKLY., 
Mar. 1, 2003; see also Ellen Goodman, Editorial, Outlawing Science, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 
2003, at A23 (lambasting the House bill that would ban therapeutic cloning). At present, it 
does not seem that the companion bill in the Senate (S. 245), sponsored by Sam Brownback 
(R.-Kan.), has enough support for passage. Carey, supra. 
 300. Therapeutic Cloning in Danger of Being Outlawed in US as Lawmakers Race to 
Ban Cloning of Human Beings, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Aug. 30, 2001, at 11. 
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Prohibition Act of 2001301 was passed by a strong margin,302 represen-
tatives recognized inconsistencies in the law’s understanding of em-
bryos. How, they wondered, was President Bush consistently able to 
sanction research on embryos produced through IVF while strongly 
opposing therapeutic cloning for the purpose of making embryos 
available to researchers.303  
 Representative Peter Deutsch (D.-Fla.) clarified his own decision 
to oppose research cloning but support embryonic research on em-
bryos produced through IVF. That combination of decisions, he ex-
plained, “gives [people] the ability to say, ‘I’m a reasonable person, 
I’m not a crazy, I don’t want human cloning.’”304 The parameters of 
the confusion suggested by Deutsch’s explanation became evident as 
the Senate prepared to vote on the bill (proposed by Senators Brown-
back (R.-Kan.) and Landrieu (D.-La.)) that mirrored the 2001 House 
bill.305 Mary Landrieu, one of the proposed bill’s sponsors, described 
herself as pro-choice and denied that positions about cloning impli-
cate positions about abortion.306 However, for the bill’s author, Sena-
tor Brownback, concern about cloning is concern about the “legal 
status of a young human” (Brownback’s description of a cloned em-
bryo).307 Moreover, as a partial result of intense lobbying efforts by 
the alliance of representatives of the biotechnology industry, scien-
tists, and patient groups, a number of pro-life Senators disentangled 
the debate about research cloning from the debate about abortion.308 
                                                                                                                      
 301. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 302. See supra note 300 and accompanying text; see also House OKs Ban, supra note 
254. 
 303. House OKs Ban, supra note 254. 
 304. Id. 
 305. The bill provided for establishing a comprehensive ban on human cloning and 
prohibiting the importation of a cloned embryo or any product derived from such embryo. 
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302 (2001). Any person or 
entity that is convicted of violating this prohibition is subject to a fine or imprisonment of 
not more than ten years, or both. Id. at § 302(c)(1). In addition, H.R. 2505 provides a civil 
penalty of not less than $1,000,000 for any person who receives a monetary gain from clon-
ing humans. However, H.R. 2505 does not prohibit the use of cloning technology to produce 
molecules, DNA, cells, tissues, organs, plants, or animals. Report 107-170, Human Cloning 
Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. lst Sess. (2001), at 2. 
 306. Kristen Philipkoski, Cloning Bill Bans Abortion Too?, WIRED NEWS, May 30, 
2002, at http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,52838,00.html (last visted Aug. 23, 
2003). 
 307. Id. (citation omitted). 
 308. Zitner, supra note 85. In large part, the lobbying campaign was led by Michael 
Manganiello, president of the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research. Id. The 
Coalition is composed of about seventy groups that favor therapeutic cloning. Kristen 
Philipkoski, Invasion of the Cloning Lobby, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 5, 2002, at http:// 
www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,50834,00.html (last visted Aug. 23, 2003); see also 
Ceci Connolly, Waging the Battle for Stem Cell Research; As Senate Vote Approaches, Coa-
lition Intensifies Year-Long Lobbying Effort, WASH. POST, June 9, 2002, at A6. The Coali-
tion for the Advancement of Medical Research (CAMR) lobbied actively to defeat a Senate 
ban on cloning. Id. CAMR and other activists supporting research cloning focused on two 
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Their choices and their explanations of those choices suggest a new 
vision of the embryo that contrasts sharply with most pro-life images 
of embryonic life. Senator Orrin Hatch’s decision to support thera-
peutic cloning is illustrative.309 Hatch (R.-Kan.), a firm abortion op-
ponent,310 shifted the debate about cloning, and by implication the 
debate about abortion, when he joined with liberal Senators Kennedy 
(D.-Mass.) and Feinstein (D.-Cal.), who had introduced a bill in the 
107th Congress that provided for medical research cloning.311 
 Hatch made the implications of his choice explicit. He first stated 
unambiguously that support for research cloning, though he avoided 
use of that term, was consistent with a pro-life stand.312 Almost as an 
afterthought, he redefined all the rules when he characterized re-
search cloning (which he labeled “regenerative medicine”) as “pro-life 
and pro-family.”313 Suddenly, in Hatch’s new understanding, support 
for embryonic research substitutes for opposition to abortion as an 
agenda that favors life and safeguards families. The shift is stagger-
ing. 
 Hatch definitively separated moral conclusions about embryos in 
the context of cloning for the production of embryonic stem cells from 
moral conclusions about embryos in the context of abortion. He in-
voked science to mediate the apparent gap between his pro-life char-
acterization of research cloning and his pro-life position in the debate 
about abortion. New science, he implied, produces a new embryo. 
Personhood, in Hatch’s new view, can no longer be equated with any 
embryo. He elucidated: 
It used to be a fertilized egg was a human being. Now, it’s an un-
fertilized egg, as long as you put a skin cell in that gives 46 chro-
                                                                                                                      
points: “the credibility of science and the power of the patient.” Id. (quoting Kevin Wilson, 
director of public policy at the American Society for Cell Biology). In addition, forty Nobel 
laureates signed a statement supporting research cloning and the National Academy of 
Sciences issued a report documenting the promising use of such research. Id. 
 309. Adriel Bettelheim, Divided Senate Examining Research Value, Moral Issues As It 
Ponders Vote on Cloning, CQ WKLY., May 4, 2002, at 1154. In April both Orrin Hatch and 
Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.), two conservative senators, announced that they would “break 
with anti-abortion colleagues and support” research cloning. Id. 
 310. Seely, supra note 285. 
 311. Bettelheim, supra note 309. Senator Hatch had not supported a bill that Senators 
Kennedy and Feinstein had introduced previously. Rick Weiss, Hatch to Support Bill Al-
lowing Stem Cell Study; Decision on Embryo Cloning is a Setback for Conservatives, WASH. 
POST, May 1, 2002, at A2. That bill was highly tolerant of research cloning. Rather, he 
joined with Kennedy and Feinstein in a new bill that required that all cloning research 
(whether or not funded by the federal government) receive approval from a scientific and 
ethics advisory board. Id.  
 312. Connolly, supra note 308. 
 313. Id. Connolly attributes Senator Hatch’s decision to support research cloning to a 
coalition of “scientists, patient advocates, Hollywood liberals and biotech executives.” Id.  
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mosomes. To me, it’s a big stretch . . . . Every day you shower, you 
shower off millions of living human cells.314 
 Others in the Senate reached similar conclusions. Senator Connie 
Mack (R.-Fla.), also an opponent of abortion, explained that, with 
cloning, “[y]ou’re using an egg that has never been fertilized by 
sperm and is never placed in a uterus. The words that we’re using 
were defined in a former age.”315 
 Thus Senator Mack, like Senator Hatch, suggested that new sci-
ence requires new language316 and that new language defines a new 
vision of moral reality. For Senator Mack, as for Senator Hatch, an 
embryo produced through cloning does not bear the moral status of 
an embryo produced in other ways. The terms of this new language 
transform moral reality. In a broader sense than Mack may have in-
tended, the language of debate about abortion (embryo, fertilization, 
and reproduction) as interpreted by a former age was grounded in dif-
ferent underlying assumptions and concerns than the language of 
debate about research cloning. 
 Not surprisingly, other pro-life advocates in the debate about 
abortion have disagreed with Senators Hatch and Mack. But in dis-
agreeing, they have been forced to contend with a new form of rheto-
ric about embryos. The Family Research Council, a group committed 
to shaping public debate to “value[] human life and uphold[] the in-
stitutions of marriage and the family,”317 characterized Hatch’s for-
mulation of the issues as “morally vacuous and scientifically inaccu-
rate.”318 The Council, in effect, deconstructed Hatch’s effort to har-
monize his positions about research cloning and abortion: 
If human life ‘begins in a mother’s nurturing womb, not in a petri 
dish,’ according to Hatch, then location is what determines the 
personhood of the human embryo. That’s nonsensical! The cloned 
human embryo Hatch wants to tinker with and destroy for re-
search has all the genetic components that a human embryo inside 
a mother’s womb has. No scientist would argue with that.319 
                                                                                                                      
 314. Adriel Bettelheim, Cloning by Any Other Name: A Defining Battle, CQ WKLY., 
June 15, 2002, at 1596, 1597. 
 315. Zitner, supra note 85. 
 316. Id. Zitner explains Mack’s decision to support therapeutic cloning to have devel-
oped as a result of his “experience with cancer.” Id. 
 317. Family Research Council, Family Research Council Mission Statement, at 
http://www.frc.org/aboutfrc.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2003). 
 318. Press Release, Family Research Council, Attack of the Human Hatch-Eries Com-
ing this May to a Lab Near You? (April 30, 2002), at http://www.frc.org/search.cfm (Docu-
ment Search, FRCCODE=P02D12) (last visted Aug. 23, 2003). 
 319. Id. 
 Yet, even for those, such as the Family Research Council, committed to understandings 
of embryonic life, originally elaborated with reference to pro-life positions on abortion, the 
medical promise of stem cell research proves compelling. The Family Research Council 
proposed committing funds to those conducting research on adult stem cells, who, the 
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Thus, in denying the validity of Hatch’s assessment, the Council also 
looked to science, but it interpreted science differently than Hatch 
had.320 
 Yet, by the summer of 2002, it became clear that the Brownback-
Landrieu bill had not garnered adequate support for passage.321 The 
108th Congress is considering several bills about cloning.322 
 At present, the transformation of discourse about embryos ap-
pears to be the most fateful consequence of the Senate’s response to 
therapeutic cloning. Appeals to science, especially by pro-life adher-
ents, have proved compelling to many in the debate about abortion.323 
They lose much of their force, however, in the debate about therapeu-
tic cloning. Theory has not changed but technology has. The con-
structed embryo can be distinguished from the embryo produced 
sexually. But at base, the debate about therapeutic cloning, as the 
debate about abortion that preceded it, is cultural, theological, and 
sentimental. And so the language of science, as it enters popular dis-
course, is reinterpreted and reshaped to suit changing assumptions 
about what is considered right and what is considered wrong. As cul-
ture and sentiment shift, understandings of the embryo shift. In the 
debate about cloning, science is ready to oblige opposing voices. And 
so in this new context, pro-life senators justify support for therapeu-
tic cloning by distinguishing research embryos from other embryos.  
 The new age (as Senator Mack has labeled the age of cloning and 
stem cell research)324 differs from the age that preceded it. The new 
age suggests new visions of personhood, family, and community. 
Among the consequences is a new debate about embryos and, thus, 
about abortion. The next Part summarizes some social implications 
of these changes. 
                                                                                                                      
Council explained, “out of respect for America’s moral leadership are pioneering the ethical 
avenue of research.” Id. This position received support in 2002 as researchers showed that 
adult bone marrow stem cells could be transformed into functioning liver cells. Tom Ma-
jeski, Bone Marrow Stem Cells from Adults Form Tissues, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
June 21, 2002 (Sooner Edition). Catherine Verfaillie, director of the Institute at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota that conducted the research, explained that, despite this success, it is 
not yet clear whether embryonic or adult stem cells will prove more useful in therapy and 
research. Id. 
 320. Further, researchers lobbying in favor of therapeutic cloning have openly sug-
gested that an entirely new vocabulary is needed to discuss cloning’s products. They would 
rename the embryo created through cloning, calling it an “activated egg[]” or a “nuclear-
transfer-derived blastocyst.” Bettelheim, supra note 314, at 1596. 
 321. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Total Ban on Cloning Research Appears Dead, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 2002, at A31. Republican and Democratic leaders disagreed on the order in which 
the Senate would vote on the cloning bills. Id. 
 322. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 323. See supra notes 106, 170-75 and accompanying text. 
 324. See Zitner, supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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V.   FROM ABORTION TO THERAPEUTIC CLONING:  
THE END OF AN “AGE”?325 
 In the debate about abortion, arguments constructed around un-
derstandings of fetal and embryonic status have worked moderately 
well for pro-life adherents. By emphasizing the notion of embryonic 
personhood, the movement muted its preference for traditional fami-
lies and its opposition to gender equality and choice within the do-
mestic sphere. This served the pro-life movement well during the last 
half of the twentieth century as Americans, in fact, became increas-
ingly committed to understandings of family that provided for di-
vorce, egalitarian marriage, contraception, and negotiated choice.326 
Ironically, however, this success is threatened as pro-life groups en-
ter the debate about therapeutic cloning in order to safeguard the no-
tion of embryonic personhood—itself only one aspect of the large set 
of underlying beliefs and values at stake in the battle about abortion. 
A.   Embryos and “Embryos” 
 That the debate about cloning is often merged with the debate 
about abortion follows from the centrality of the embryo to each dis-
course. Abortion opponents, committed at least since Roe327 to a plat-
form that features the personhood of embryonic life, have, at least in 
part, entered the debate about cloning to safeguard that platform. 
But the questions at stake in the debate about cloning encourage 
new understandings of embryonic life, even among groups of people 
long associated with antiabortion politics.328 As the embryo is reex-
amined and redefined in reference to cloning, the debate about abor-
tion is encompassed by, and ultimately transformed into, a debate 
that assumes individuality and choice. The irony is clear: in safe-
guarding the pretext329 (the personhood of embryos), pro-life adher-
ents may be sacrificing the underlying text (a traditional way of life 
that eschews choice and autonomy). 
 At base, discourse about abortion concerns the parameters of rela-
tionships (especially within families), the significance of gender in 
understandings of personhood, and the comparative value of 
autonomous individuality and choice. In contrast, discourse about 
cloning largely assumes autonomy and choice and concerns the pa-
rameters of personhood in light of that assumption. Thus, cloning 
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 327. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 328. See Zitner, supra note 85. 
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discourse reflects the extent to which the debate about family, under-
lying the debate about abortion, has been resolved in favor of indi-
vidual autonomy and choice. 
 Moreover, the debate about cloning is part of a wider discourse 
about reproductive technology, genetic engineering, and genetic in-
formation. Each of these developments has contributed to the medi-
calization330 and commodification of families and has thus facilitated 
a form of family increasingly distinct from that prized by many pro-
life adherents. Moreover, these developments contribute to an under-
standing of the embryo that elides or openly dismisses the notion of 
embryonic personhood. Thus, participation in the debate about clon-
ing threatens both the text and the pretext of the pro-life movement. 
 This result is already evident in social and legal responses to re-
productive technology and, in particular, in several courts’ responses 
to cases involving frozen embryos. A number of state courts, asked to 
resolve disputes about cryopreserved embryos, have, for instance, 
looked to contractual agreements among infertility clinics and gam-
ete donors.331 In looking to contractual agreements, these courts have 
presumed that embryos are not persons. In some cases, courts have, 
in effect, defined embryos as commodities despite their own protesta-
tions. For instance, in Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
concluded that embryos are owed “special respect” because of their 
“potential for human life.” 332 The court explained:  
[P]reembryos are not, strictly speaking, either “persons” or “prop-
erty,” but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special 
respect because of their potential for human life. It follows that 
any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the 
preembryos in this case is not a true property interest. However, 
they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent 
that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of 
the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law.333 
Despite this characterization of embryonic status, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court evaded the issue of how to pay respect to the eight cryo-
preserved embryos at issue in the case. Instead, the court turned to 
the comparative interests of the disputing adult progenitors. The 
court noted that in the absence of a contract between the parties 
about the fate of the embryos should they not be used for their in-
                                                                                                                      
 330. See KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON 
THE MEDICAL FRONTIER 175-76 (2000). Finkler defines medicalization as “the drawing into 
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tended purpose, the interest of the party anxious to avoid procreation 
should prevail.334 The court then ordered that the embryos be deliv-
ered to that party (in this case, the husband, who announced that he 
had had the embryos destroyed).335 The court provided no explana-
tion of the apparent discrepancy between its categorizing the em-
bryos as special and then facilitating their destruction.336 Since 
Davis, a number of state courts have considered similar cases. Most 
of them have echoed the preference of the Davis court for a contrac-
tual analysis337 in resolving disputes between divorcing couples about 
frozen embryos.338 
As a group, these cases suggest a complicated vision of em-
bryos. Rhetoric about the special respect owed embryos because of 
their potential for human life suggests they cannot be treated like 
commodities. Yet, the willingness of state courts to enforce contracts 
about the disposition of embryos or to determine the fate of disputed 
embryos in light of the interests of the progenitors suggests that, at 
base, embryos lack a moral status. The jurisprudence that has devel-
oped around spare embryos produced through IVF reflects a society 
often ready to define embryos instrumentally339 but anxious at the 
same time to mask that fact from itself. 
 A similar result may ensue as society answers questions raised by 
therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem cell research.340 This is sug-
gested by pro-life adherents who support therapeutic cloning and 
stem cell research and who mediate the apparent inconsistency by 
redefining the term embryo or by separating conclusions about em-
bryonic status in one context from conclusions about that status in 
other contexts.341 The result might be termed the fractionated em-
bryo. The process of redefining embryos is being encouraged by pro-
                                                                                                                      
 334. Id. at 604. 
 335. Mark Curriden, Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Embryos 
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research lobbyists who have constructed a new language within 
which, and a new set of images through which, to contemplate the 
uses and the meaning of embryos.342 
 In the context of the abortion debate embryos are confused with 
fetuses and both are viewed as small people. One scientist, who 
asked people to draw an embryo, was presented with portraits of “a 
fetus with a face.”343 In contrast, in the context of the debate about 
embryonic research and cloning, embryos are being reimagined. In 
this context, embryos can be portrayed as cells, of significance not in 
and of themselves, but because of their potential to help cure disabil-
ity and treat disease. Pro-research lobbyists have consistently asso-
ciated embryonic stem cells, and cloning to produce them, with mov-
ing images of sick children and famous, disabled, or ill adults for 
whom stem cell research promises relief from illness and debility. 
Christopher Reeve, for instance, known for his acting role as Super-
man and paralyzed in a horseback riding accident in 1995, has ac-
tively campaigned against a ban on therapeutic cloning.344 Moreover, 
a number of children, some the offspring of active proponents of re-
search cloning, have spoken to legislators and journalists. Hollywood 
producer Jerry Zucker arranged a meeting between one senator 
(whom he declined to name) and his thirteen year-old daughter Ka-
tie, who suffers from juvenile diabetes. Zucker summarized Katie’s 
words to the Senator: “as far as I know a skin cell doesn’t suffer the 
way I suffer and a skin cell inserted into an egg cell doesn’t have 
dreams like I have.”345 Similarly, pro-research lobbyists have focused 
on Tessa Wick, the daughter of a therapeutic cloning activist, who 
asked how Senator Brownback could prefer “a bunch of cells” to her. 
“It’s so scary to me,” she said, “that this guy I don’t even know could 
do that. It’s like he’s killing me.”346 Such stories, including at least 
one that he heard personally from a four-year-old with diabetes, con-
vinced Senator Orrin Hatch that therapeutic cloning is “pro-life and 
pro-family.”347 With a similar focus on individuals’ tales, Governor 
Jeanne Shaheen, then running for the United States Senate from 
New Hampshire, was surrounded by a five-year old with diabetes, a 
man with a spinal cord injury, and the widow of a Parkinson’s victim, 
as she announced, in August 2002, that she favored federal funding 
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 343. Kotler, supra note 39 (quoting Irv Weissman). 
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for embryonic stem cell research.348 The images produced by such 
narratives can provide alternatives to and thus displace pro-life im-
ages of fetuses and embryos. In the face of images of embryos-as-
salvation for individual, sick children and disabled heroes, assertions 
about embryonic personhood may pale. And thus, ironically, pro-life 
adherents refer to therapeutic cloning as pro-family even as the pro-
life movement continues to displace discourse about families with 
discourse about embryos in the debate about abortion. 
 The implications extend beyond strategy. Lobbying (as is the case 
for advertising generally) can create needs, but to be compelling, and 
thus effective, lobbying (as with advertising) must be supported by 
people’s willingness to believe that these needs will satisfy deeper 
longings.349 Embryonic stem cell research is presented as a means of 
satisfying the need for health and the yearning for physical well-
being. In the contemporary context, the satisfaction of that need and 
that yearning suggests a new form of individual salvation. 
 In large part, the promise of embryonic stem cell research is the 
promise of individualized medical care. Stem cells derived from 
therapeutic cloning mimic the genome of the person cloned. Alta 
Charo and Laurie Zoloth describe some of the implications for indi-
vidual cures that may result from stem cells produced from cloned 
embryos: 
 This basic science is not just another way to patch damaged or-
gans. Remove the nucleus from a donated egg and replace it with 
the nucleus of a body cell from someone with a genetic disease. 
Shock this egg so that it begins to divide. In a few short days, de-
rive genetically identical stem cells that will grow into small labo-
ratory sample tissue of the diseased organs. Now you can learn 
how the genetic mutation causes illness and test drugs to cure it. 
No other form of stem cell research can be used for this work.350 
Embryonic stem cell research with cloned embryos thus promises a 
mode of therapy that harmonizes stunningly with the underlying de-
sires of a society concerned with safeguarding individual autonomy 
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in an wide number of social settings. For a society increasingly com-
mitted to individualism in virtually all social settings, therapeutic 
cloning provides a remarkably compelling context within which to 
redefine the embryo that was defined in the debate about abortion. 
B.   Mediating Confusion 
 In consequence, the debate about therapeutic cloning grounds a 
wider, less explicit debate about the contours of personhood. In shift-
ing from a focus on the embryo as the subject of abortion to a focus on 
the embryo as the object of stem cell research, society is re-
conceptualizing the moral implications of embryonic status. That re-
conceptualization reflects a more encompassing ideological transfor-
mation as a society constructed in response to the Industrial Revolu-
tion adjusts to a new set of scientific and technological developments 
and the economic interests that support and further them.351 
 As this transformation proceeds, society and the law suffer from 
confusion and ambivalence. The fractionalization of responses to em-
bryonic status in contexts352 not directly concerned with abortion pro-
vides a telling illustration of the effort to make sense of change. By 
mediating between old understandings and new ones, the embryo-as-
symbol projects the illusion of continuity and thus social stability. 
The continuity of the symbol, despite its shifting interpretations, al-
lows society to construct new interpretations of personhood without 
openly abandoning old ones. New understandings of embryo impli-
cate old understandings. And the process of social change is blurred 
by the presumption that embryos in one context are no different from 
embryos in other contexts. Or, to add mightily to social and legal con-
fusion, the opposite presumption, that embryos in one context 
(therapeutic cloning, for instance) are unlike embryos in other con-
texts (abortion, for instance),353 allows pro-life adherents to become 
                                                                                                                      
 351. Central among these developments is the advent of electronic media and new un-
derstandings that are resulting from the work of molecular biologists (including the so-
called new genetics). 
 352. Discrepant understandings of embryo have developed in a variety of legal con-
texts. Some understanding, such as those developing in the context of the debate about 
therapeutic cloning, counter a pro-life agenda. Others support that agenda. For instance, 
the administration of George W. Bush has proposed defining a child as “an individual un-
der the age of 19 including the period from conception to birth,” in the context of the fed-
eral State Children’s Health Insurance Program. State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram; Eligibility for Prenatal Care for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,936-01, 9,939 (Mar. 
5, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2003)). The definition would result in the pro-
gram’s paying for the care of the fetus but not of the pregnant woman carrying the fetus. 
See Michelle Hibbert, Fetus as Person: Woman As . . .?: The Bush Administration’s Redefi-
nition of “Child,” LAW & BIOETHICS REP., June 2002, at 10. 
 353. Zitner, supra note 85 (referring to lawmakers asserting that cloned embryos are 
different from embryos created through fertilization of egg with sperm). Senator Connie 
Mack (R.-Fla.), for instance, opined that cloning does not lead to the creation of embryos: 
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supporters of embryonic research without openly reexamining the 
implications of the battle over abortion. 
 The developing panoply of responses to the meaning of embryo or 
fetus suggests a society ready for change but ambivalent about the 
implications of the process. At present, embryos and fetuses may con-
tinue to symbolize a vision of family, an understanding of maternity, 
a source of life, and a view of woman (and, by implication, of man), 
but alternative referents begin to displace that vision. Diverse 
frames of social reference establish the primacy of one, or several, 
meanings for various purposes, but other less explicit meanings in-
evitably influence responses and direct society’s complicated efforts 
to understand the meaning of embryos and fetuses and thus, the 
meaning of personhood, and in a sense, the meaning of society itself. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The debate about abortion is a product of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries during which time personhood was defined 
through a bifurcated reference to home and community, on the one 
hand, and to work and autonomy, on the other. In that cultural con-
text, pro-life images of the aborted fetus—representing women’s un-
natural choice—suggest a desecration of the forms through which so-
cial and familial life are presumed most felicitously to proceed. In 
contrast, the debate about embryonic research is a product of a dif-
ferent time and a different culture, one within which personhood is 
being widely reconstructed. Increasingly, individual autonomy is 
valued, and the gap between home and work blurs.  
 The new debate about embryonic research resembles the debate 
about abortion in extending a discursive context within which society 
can reflect on itself and on its understandings of self and other. How-
ever, it rests on new assumptions and raises new questions. The cen-
tral social questions underlying the debate about abortion have 
largely been settled in social practice. During the last decades of the 
twentieth century, society opted widely and often enthusiastically for 
autonomy and choice in familial settings.354 Many continue to argue 
about values and systems of belief relevant to the domestic sphere, 
but the demographic reality belies the presumed purpose of extended 
debate. Although the wisdom of the transformation of family that oc-
curred during the last century can be, and is still, questioned in pub-
lic discourse, the development seems deeply entrenched and is 
unlikely soon to be undone.355 
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 In contrast, the most important questions arising within the de-
bate about embryonic research and therapeutic cloning (and more 
widely about genetic information and its uses) concern the character 
of the individual person in a universe with the capacity to prolong 
life long beyond current expectations, to alter people’s minds and 
bodies—and perhaps their souls—through technology, and to select 
physical and affective traits prenatally. 
 And so, in the debate about embryonic research and therapeutic 
cloning, one side (often, but not always, synonymous with the pro-life 
side356 in the abortion debate) continues to define embryos as people 
but begins to justify and qualify that definition.357 Another, opposing 
group, responds more variously. Here, in contrast to most discussions 
about abortion, at least some voices publicly define embryos as cells 
without a moral status, at least until they are used.358 Thus, by sug-
gesting a moral use for these cells—by connecting such cells with the 
salvationist promise of long life and health—the moral position be-
comes the one that favors embryonic research and therapeutic clon-
ing. Pro-life placards and articles featuring images of aborted fetuses 
have horrified many people generally unsupportive of the broad pro-
life agenda. Even for a society that has in practice largely abandoned 
the world of traditional family that underlies the pro-life movement’s 
focus on embryonic and fetal status, those images have proved pro-
foundly discomforting. Strangely, pro-choice adherents have rarely 
constructed compelling responses.359 But in the context of embryonic 
stem cell research, the embryo, as presented in the public assertions 
of pro-life groups, meets its nemesis: images of sick children, suffer-
ing adults, and grieving relatives, whose salvation is presumed to 
depend on a new understanding of the term embryo.360 These images 
suggest hapless luck and undeserved pain and in that, as well, they 
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counter pro-life portraits depicting the torture endured by aborted 
embryos. 
 In short, comparison of the assumptions underlying the debate 
about embryonic research and therapeutic cloning with assumptions 
underlying the debate about abortion suggests a broad shift in 
American ideology. Some commentators have concluded that the de-
bate about embryonic stem cell research is a boon to pro-life adher-
ents.361 If so, that success may prove itself short-lived. Over time, the 
conflation of the debate about abortion with the debate about embry-
onic stem cell research may be the undoing, rather than the revivifi-
cation, of the pro-life movement. Or alternatively, the meaning of the 
embryo may become more and more fractionalized, thereby allowing 
each debate to continue largely unaffected by the other. Should that 
occur, the battle about abortion will be neither won nor lost as soci-
ety and the law respond to embryonic research. Or perhaps, instead, 
the battle about abortion will slowly be encompassed by other con-
cerns as the ideological frame within which society understands itself 
shifts.362 
 Both the debate about abortion and that about embryonic re-
search are also debates about social transition. The future is murky, 
but these conflated debates provide the analyst with a view of society 
contemplating itself and its most deeply held convictions. 
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